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I Hereinafter the "SEC" or the "Commission."
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gated Rule 1Ob-52 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3 In
the succeeding decades, 1Ob-5 has become the primary deterrent
against fraudulent activities in securities transactions. Its evolution
is largely due to the private rights of action that have been implied
under the Rule.
4
The Rule applies to six distinct factual patterns: trading on the
basis of undisclosed material information; issuing misleading corpo-
rate publicity; selectively disclosing important nonpublic data, com-
monly called "tipping;" mismanaging a corporation; manipulating a
securities market; and trading and other activities of broker-dealers.
Each of these types of breaches requires that a successful plaintiff
demonstrate a number of substantive elements. 5
Failure to prove one of these elements defeats a plaintiff's claim
because a 1Ob-5 breach is then not shown. For example, a plaintiff's
knowledge that a defendant's face-to-face statement is false pre-
cludes his claim based on that misstatement.6 The focus of this
Article is different. We treat here the affirmative defenses which
thwart liability even though the defendant breached the Rule.
Being an implied remedy, Rule 10b-5 contains no express
affirmative defenses.' However, courts have identified a number of
defenses that block recovery against both primarily and secondarily
liable defendants. 8
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as the "Rule" or "10b-5"]. The Rule
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange.
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, as amended (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974)) [hereinafter cited as "Exchange Act" or
"1934 Act"]. Another major federal securities law is the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat.
74, as amended (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970 & Supp. IV 1974))
[hereinafter cited as "Securities Act" or "1933 Act"].
4 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5, § 8 (Clark Boardman & Co., Ltd. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as A. JACOBS].
.A. JAcoBs, at parts 2-9.
See id. § 64.01[b][ii] nn.56-60 and accompanying text.
Vanderboom v. Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1178, 1193 (W.D. Ark. 1969), rev'd, 422 F.2d 1233
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
1 See, e.g., Knapp v. Walden, 367 F. Supp. 385, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Note,
Applicability of Waiver, Estoppel, and Laches Defenses to Private Suits Under the Securities Act and
S.E.C. Rule 1OB-5: Deterrence and Equity in Balance, 73 YALE L.J. 1477, 1489 (1964).
RULE lOb-5 DEFENSES
The policies underlying 1Ob-5, 9 and its remedial nature and
broad construction,1 ° suggest that affirmative defenses be as narrow
as possible. 1 Regardless of the scope of the defense, under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants must plead them in
their answer.' 2 An exception to this pleading rule occurs when the
plaintiff exhibits unclean hands, since that defense protects the
court's integrity.'3
A knotty issue arises when the class representative in a class
action or the plaintiff suing on behalf of the company in a derivative
suit is personally subject to a defense, while those he represents are
not. For example, he and the defendants might be equally guilty of
perpetrating the fraud,' 4 although the other class members (in a
class action) or the company and the remaining stockholders (in a
derivative suit) were innocent of any wrongdoing. Courts should
disqualify the individual plaintiff from acting as the class representa-
tive, 15 but should permit him to prosecute a derivative suit.16
The SEC may seek disgorgement of profits as ancillary relief
"in order to remove any monetary reward for violations of section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5.1'1 7 Even though an affirmative defense in a
private action will bar recovery for those persons who would receive
the profits, a court should nonetheless deprive a defendant of his
illicit gains in an SEC suit.
9 See A. JACOBS § 6.
10 See id. § 7 n.8 and accompanying text.
11 Bell, How to Bar an Uninnocent Investor-The Validi6j of Common Law Defenses to Private
Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1970) (narrowest
common-law view); see notes 218-19, 235-38, 302-04, 342-43, 368-71 and accompanying text
infra. Contra, Bahlman, Rule 10b-5: The Case for Its Full Acceptance as Federal Corporation Law, 37
U. CIN. L. REv. 727, 774 (1968) (defenses should be liberally provided).
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Among the I0b-5 cases following this precept are John R. Lewis
Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1971) (inpari delicto); McGraw v. Matthaei, 388 F.
Supp. 84,88 (E.D. Mich. 1972);see Kerby v. Commodity Resources Inc., 395 F. Supp. 786,791
(D. Colo. 1975) (more appropriate to raise statute of limitations in answer than in motion to
dismiss). Contra, Hogan v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (inpari
delicto).
13 Hogan v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 n.8 (N.D. Il. 1971); cf. 27 AM.JUR.
2d Equity § 136 (1966) (common law); 30 C.J.S. Equity § 97 (1965) (common law).
14 This would make him in pari delicto with the defendant, and preclude recovery. See part
IV A infra.
15 See Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555 (N.D.
I1. 1972) (hold preliminary hearing to assess personal defense against class representative; if
valid defense, representative cannot continue); Comment, Plaintiff's Conduct as a Bar to Recovery
Under the Securities Acts: In Pari Delicto, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 181, 197 (1969) (disqualify or do n6t"
permit recovery).
"6 See Comment, supra note 15, at 195-96.
17 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d
1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971.
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This Article examines a defendant's right to defeat a claim by
interposing a defense. Yet defenses can cut both ways: a plaintiff can
claim a defense to keep a defendant from raising another defense.
For instance, a defendant might intentionally waive his right to
assert laches.18
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In the context of lOb-5 suits, a statute of limitations defense is
available whether the cause of action is considered legal or equita-
ble,1 9 and whether or not laches is a defense in the pending suit.20
The authorities rightly conclude that the same statute of limitations
principles govern buyers and sellers.2' Our assessment of statute of
limitations only involves private rights of action. The Commission is
not subject to any statute of limitations when it sues under 1Ob-5,
even if it seeks ancillary relief.2 2 Criminal actions are governed by
the catch-all period in the federal criminal laws. 23 The ensuing
" See In re Alodex Corp. Sec. Litigation, 392 F. Supp. 672, 684-85 (S.D. Iowa 1975)
(discussing estoppel asserted against defendants who sought to raise statute of limitations).
19 Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc.
v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 326-27 (D. Del. 1956), affd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir.
1957); Comment, Statutes Of Limitation in 1 OB-5 Actions: A Proposal For Congressional Legislation,
24 SYR. L. REv. 1154, 1159-60 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Statutes Of Limitations]; 70 HARV. L.
Rav. 566, 567 (1957); see Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir. 1965) (federal tolling
doctrine whether legal or equitable). But see Comment, Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
X-lOB-5: Guided Missile or Flying Saucer?, 32 TEXAS L. Rav. 197, 204 n.31 (1953); Note,
Purchaser's Duty to Disclose Under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X-1OB-5, 40 MINN. L.
REv. 62, 75 (1955); Note, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded
Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1132 (1950). See generally A. JAcoBs § 14 nn.21-27 and accom-
panying text (legal or equitable nature of 10b-5).
20 Shapiro v. Schwamm, 279 F. Supp. 798, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Trussell v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 776 (D. Colo. 1964); Statutes Of Limitations, supra note 19
at 1159-60; see Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Tobacco &
Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 326-27 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 244
F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957). As to the defense of laches, see part II infra.
21 See Vanderboom v. Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1178, 1191 (W.D. Ark. 1969), rev'd, 422 F.2d
1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
22 Black & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED SEC. L. REP. 79,921, at 84-383-
84 (July 12, 1974) (initial decision); cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126,
132-33 (1938); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924); Federal
Maritime Comm'n v. Caragher, 364 F.2d 709, 718 (2d Cir. 1966); EEOC v. Laacke &Joys Co.,
375 F. Supp. 852, 853 (E.D. Wis. 1974); H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1123 (1953); Martenet, Statutes of Limitations in SEC Enforcement Proceed-
ings, 41 VA. L. REv. 59, 62 (1955).
23 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970) (five years). This period was applied in United States v.
Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 797 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829 (1975) (1933 Act § 17(a)), and
United States v. Sloan, 389 F. Supp. 526, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Exchange Act § 17).
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discussion examines the appropriate statutory time period, 4 when
that time period begins to run,25 and the events that stop it.26
A. The Time Period
Federal law governs the statutory period of limitations in the
area of securities regulation. However, neither section 10(b) nor
Rule 1Ob-5 contains a statute of limitations, and no general statutory
period exists for breaches of the 1934 Act or for civil actions based
on a federal statute.28 Other 1933 Act and 1934 Act remedies
require that the plaintiff sue within one year after discovering the
offense, but in any event not more than three years after the viola-
tion.2 9 Some authorities advocate this period for lOb-5 actions.30
The cases refuse to adopt this measure, 31 however, even if the
24 See part I A infra.
25 See part I B infra.
26 See part I C infra.
27 Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston & Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 830 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
28 See, e.g., Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir.
1974); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758 (5th Cir. 1974); Maine v. Leonard, 353 F.
Supp. 968, 969 (W.D. Va. 1973); Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 441 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d
1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 143 (D. Md. 1968), modified, 412 F.2d
571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Shapiro v. Schwamm, 279 F. Supp. 798,
802 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 775 (D. Colo.
1964); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d
685 (6th Cir. 1960).
29 See Securities Act § 13 (must bring suits under 1933 Act §§ 11 & 12 within one year of
discovery or after plaintiff should have discovered, but in any event within three years; must
bring suits under 1933 Act § 12(1) within one year of violation and within three years of
making offer to public); Exchange Act § 9(e) (within one year after discovery of facts and
within three years after violation); § 16(b) (within two years after profit realized); § 18(c)
(within one year after discovery of facts and within three years after cause of action accrued);
and § 29(b) (within one year after discovery and within three years after violation). Section 13
of the 1933 Act was changed from two and ten year periods to its present one and three year
periods when Congress enacted the 1934 Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 207, 15
U.S.C. § 77m (1970),formerly ch. 38, § 13, 48 Stat. 84 (1933).
30 Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule lob-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125,
1149-50.
31 See Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1362 (10th Cir. 1974); United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481
F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1973); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 914
(9th Cir. 1971) (do not use § 29(b) period); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1056
n.10 (2d Cir. 1969); Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47, 51 (7th Cir.
1968); Kelly v. West Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,835, at 96,808 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (do not use 1933 Act § 13); Mittendorf v.J.R. Williston &
Beane Inc., 372 F. Suep. 821, 830 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212, 1214 (D. Minn. 1973); Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (D.
Mass. 1972); Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 561
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177, 182 n. 1 (N.D. Ga.
1972); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 845 (E.D. Va. 1968); Hendricks v.
Flato Realty Invs., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,290, at 97,389
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plaintiff could have sued under one of the sections containing a
specific limitations period. 32 Courts instead adopt a state statute of
limitations. This raises two obvious questions: which state should be
chosen and which statute in that state should be selected? Even if
most of the acts constituting the 10b 5 breach occurred outside the
forum, federal courts, with two minor exceptions, will adopt a
limitations period from the forum state. 33
The first exception arises if a case is transferred between courts
in different states. When a transfer occurs for the convenience of
the parties,34 the, transferee court adopts a statute of limitations
from the state in which the transferor court sits. 35 But if venue
considerations cause the transfer,36 the transferee court chooses the
appropriate period from the laws of the state in which it sits. 37 Class
(S.D. Tex. 1968) (1933 Act § 13); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724, 734-35 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
(do not use periods contained in Exchange Act §§ 9(e) or 18(c), but leave open question of
applicability of § 29(b)); Rustic v. Werblin, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 91,637, at 95,376 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (do not use 1934 Act § 18(c)); Premier Indus., Inc. v.
Delaware Valley Fin. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
32 Rotstein v. Reynolds & Co., 359 F. Supp. 109, 111-12 (N.D. I1. 1973); Hendricks v.
Flato Realty Invs., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,290, at 97,389
(S.D. Tex. 1968) (1934 Act § 29(b)); Maher v. J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133,
141 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Phillip v. J.H. Lederer Co., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 91,039, at 93,496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Contra, In re Bache & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,571, at 92,666 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (use limitation period
of 1934 Act § 9 if actions violate that section).
33 See, e.g., Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 1975); Schaefer v. First Nat'l
Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1682 (1976); Hudak v. Economic
Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir. 1974); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d
750, 758 (5th Cir. 1974),modifying 352 F. Supp. 66,75-77 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Wolfv. Frank, 477
F.2d 467, 475 (5th Cir. 1973); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), 405 U.S. 918 (1972); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435
F.2d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 1970); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1237 (8th Cir.
1970); Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965, 970 (2d Cir. 1968); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec.
Corp., 282 F.2d 195,205 (5th Cir. 1960),cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Newburger, Loeb &
Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364, 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277,
1280 (W.D. Va. 1973); Smith v. Guaranty Serv. Corp., 51 F.R.D. 289, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
Looking to state law for the period is consistent with the Rules of Decisions Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1652 (1970) (use state law unless Constitution, treaties, or laws of Congress apply), which
traces its parentage to 1 Stat. 92 (1789).
For convenience, this Article will use the term "forum" to designate the state from which
the court adopts a statutory period. This definition therefore does not reflect the two excep-
tions.
34 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
35 Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758 (5th Cir. 1974), modjfying 352 F. Supp. 66,
76-77 (M.D. Fla. 1972); H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963); Corey v. Bache & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (S.D. W. Va.
1973); Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 44, 46 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
36 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1970).
" Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1974), modifying 352 F. Supp.
66, 77 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
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actions attacking the same conduct may be transferred for the con-
venience of the parties to one state from a number of other states.
The transferee court should then apply the longest period any
transferor court would adopt to the extent that: (1) identical defen-
dants are named; (2) the complaints contain the same substantive
allegations; and (3) the size of the class is comparable.
The second "exception" to the application of the forum state's
statute of limitations requires a federal court to observe the forum's
borrowing statute.3 8 Borrowing statutes compel state courts to bor-
row a shorter period from another state under certain circum-
stances. For example, the New York borrowing statute requires its
courts to apply the shorter of New York's statute of limitations and
the period of the state in which the cause of action accrued, if the
plaintiff is not a New York resident.3 9 The proper application of
borrowing statutes involves a combination of federal and state law.
When a borrowing statute refers to a cause of action "accruing
without the state,' 40 state case law must fix what the quoted words
mean. 41 For example, New York has construed such a clause to
mean the place from which the fraudulent scheme was controlled.42
Federal law then applies the facts of the pending case to the state
court's construction of the borrowing statute.43 Thus, federal law
determines the state from which control was exercised.
When a case is transferred for the convenience of the parties, or
a borrowihg statute is used, a court must choose from among the
statutes of limitations of a state other than the one in which it sits. In
making this selection, the court should rely on precedents of the
38 Sack v. Low, 478 F.2d 360, 365 (2d Cir. 1973); Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212, 1217 (D. Minn. 1973); Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1179-80
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801, 803 (D. Colo. 1964);
cf. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. Burchfield, 366 F. Supp. 1364, 1367-68
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (margin rules).
39 N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 202 (McKinney 1972).
40 Id.
41 Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), quoting Moviecolor Ltd.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961); Trussell v. United Underwriters,
Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801, 803 (D. Colo. 1964).
42 Ripley v. International Ry. of Cent. America, 8 App. Div. 2d 310, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st
Dep't. 1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960), construed in Norte
& Co. v. Krock, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,295, at 97,408-09
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). But see Sack v. Low, 478 F.2d 360, 365 (2d Cir. 1973), quoting RESTATE-
MENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1925) (for tort actions, "where 'the last event
necessary to make an actor liable . . . takes place.' ").
43 See note 27 and accompanying text supra.But see Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174,
1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (unclear if court refers to this question or to issue discussed in note 44
and accompanying text infra).
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circuit in which the foreign state is situated. 44 The courts of appeals
have formulated generalized tests for choosing the proper statute.
Their results are not uniform, however, due to the absence of
hard-and-fast guidelines, 45 the diversity of 1Ob-5's substantive ele-
ments as construed by the eleven courts of appeals, 46 the variety
among states as to the types of causes of action that have statutes of
limitations, and the dissimilarities among state blue sky laws.47
State law does not determine when the period begins to run or
what events interrupt it.48 Nor does a federal court adopt the state
statute's procedural or substantive nuances. 49 A 1Ob-5 plaintiff,
therefore, is not required to make a tender within the period spe-
cified by the state statute of limitations.5 ° In short, the state supplies
only the measuring period-a specific number of years.
Courts have espoused some general principles for choosing the
proper limitations period. Following a Supreme Court decision con-
struing another federal law,51 the Sixth Circuit opined in Charney v.
Thomas52 that the correct statute is the one that "best effectuates the
federal policy at issue. ' 53 The "federal policy" should consider the
11 Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 44,46 (S.D. Iowa 1973).But see Corey v. Bache
& Co., 355 F. Supp. 1123, 1125-26 (S.D.W. Va. 1973) (deciding question de novo).
" Josef's of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Southern Inv. Co., 349 F. Supp. 1057, 1059-60 (S.D. Fla.
1972) (substantial conflict among the circuits).
46 Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1972) (divergent results
lay in differing interpretations of the scope of lOb-5); Ruder & Cross, supra note 30, at
1146-47 (different substantive elements of 10b-5); see Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 90, 104 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,* 404 U.S. 1001 (1971), and 405 U.S. 918 (1972) (choice
depends in part on elements of IOb-5). Even if the elements of a 1Ob-5 cause of action were
uniform among the circuits, different limitations periods might remain. The courts are
reluctant to change limitations periods because prospective litigants rely on the periods. See
notes 108-09 and accompanying text infra.
47 Blue sky laws are one choice of the type of statute a federal court has to supply the
period.
48 See parts I B & I C infra.
" Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 1000 n.5 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1974),citing Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467,475 (5th Cir. 1973); Nickels v.
Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 804, 808 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v.
Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 562 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
50 See, e.g., Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 475 (5th Cir. 1973).
- UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966) (construing Labor Management
Relations Act).
52 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967).
5' Id. at 100; accord, Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1294 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1682 (1976); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 125 (7th Cir.
1972); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1971) ("considera-
tion of the objectives of the substantive federal statute and how they can best be achieved");
Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1237 (8th Cir. 1970); Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212, 1215 (D. Minn. 1973); Corey v. Bache & Co., 355 F. Supp.
1123, 1125 (S.D.W. Va. 1973); Maine v. Leonard, 353 F. Supp. 968, 970-71 (W.D. Va. 1973);
Josef's of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Southern Inv. Co., 349 F. Supp. 1057, 1058-59 (S.D. Fla. 1972);
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Rule's underlying philosophy, 54 its remedial nature, and broad con-
struction.5 5 Judge Hill analyzed this test:
[T]wo things must be considered: first, which state substantive
statute is closer in purpose to Rule lOb-5; second, which limitation
period, considered apart from the substantive law it controls, best
effectuates the purposes of Rule 10b-5?56
The Eighth Circuit expanded on the Sixth Circuit's test in
Vanderboom v. Sexton:5 7
Since the standard for determining the applicable statute of
limitations is to select the statute that best effectuates the federal
policy involved, it is appropriate to look to the local statute which
bears the closest resemblance to the federal statute involved.
Both state and federal law play a role in this "resemblance test."
Under the first step, federal law determines 1 Ob-5's characteristics. 58
The Rule proscribes many kinds of activities. A court could there-
fore reasonably apply one statute of limitations of the forum state in
a first type of 1 Ob-5 action (e.g., misrepresentation) and another in a
second type of lOb-5 case (e.g., mismanagement). The rationale for
selecting the periods from different state causes of action is that the
parameters of the two types of 1 Ob-5 violations are so dissimilar; the
former is akin to common-law fraud or a violation of a blue sky law,
while the latter resembles a breach of fiduciary duties by corporate
management. Fortunately, courts use the same statute of limitations
of a forum for all species of lOb-5 actions.5 9 Perhaps the first court
Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp. 997, 999 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor
& Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177, 182 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F.
Supp. 890, 906 (D. Me. 1971).
'4 See Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 804, 807 (N.D. Ohio 1975);
Statute Of Limitions, supra note 19, at 1163. See generally A. JAcoBs § 6 (policies underlying
lOb-5).
55 See A. JACOBS § 7 n.8 and accompanying text.
56 Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp. 997, 999 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
57 422 F.2d 1233, 1237-38 (8th Cir. 1970); accord, Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 509 (7th
Cir. 1975); Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1974); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758 (5th Cir. 1974);
Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1972) (Charney and Vanderboom
are resemblance tests); Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 804, 806 (N.D.
Ohio 1975); Puttkammer v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Co., 365 F. Supp. 495, 497 (N.D. I11. 1973);
Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (D. Minn. 1973); Kramer
v. Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83, 85 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Maine v. Leonard, 353 F. Supp. 968,969
(W.D. Va. 1973); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 906 (D. Me.
1971).
5 See A. JACOBS, parts 2-9.
For example, the same New York statute has been used in misrepresentation, manipu-
lation, and mismanagement cases. See, e.g., Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344 (2d Cir.
1972); Klein v. Auchincloss, Parker & Redpath, 436 F.2d 339 '(2d Cir. 1971).
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selecting a limitation period for a state-a choice that will govern all
kinds of 1Ob-5 cases-is influenced by the sort of 1Ob-5 cause of
action alleged in the pending lawsuit.6 0 The second step in the
resemblance test employs the forum's law to establish the parame-
ters of the various sorts of state causes of action. Following these two
steps-one using federal and the other state law-a court can com-
pare the characteristics of 1Ob-5 with those of the state causes of
action and then select the state cause of action most closely resem-
bling 10b-5.6'
Aside from the Eighth Circuit's resemblance test and the Sixth
Circuit's criterion focusing on the period that best effectuates the
Rule's purposes, courts have announced other guides for selecting
the proper period. First, regardless of the test used, a choice is
questionable if the period is unusually long or short.12 Ten years is
60 See Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 804, 809 (N.D. Ohio 1975)
(distinguishing prior case under different facts); In re Alodex Corp. Sec. Litigation, 392 F.
Supp. 672, 674 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177,
184 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (used fraud statute of limitations "[s]ince the complaint in the present
case is most nearly akin to a complaint of fraud"). If the first 1Ob-5 case to posit the statute of
limitations issue is a mismanagement case, the statute of limitations chosen is more likely to
resemble that for mismanagement than if the first 1Ob-5 case involved a misrepresentation.
61 In re Alodex Corp. Sec. Litigation, 392 F. Supp. 672, 675-78 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (state
law used to determine parameters of state cause of action and federal law for 10b-5); Denny v.
Performance Sys., Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,387, at
91,981 (M.D. Tenn. 1971) (state law reveals what period would apply if action not based on
federal law); Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (federal law
determines nature of daim; state law ascertains where it fits in state scheme); Northern Trust
Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 965-66 (N.D. Ill. 1952) (state law sets scope
of state statutes of limitations); Ruder & Cross, supra note 30, at 1144 (determine lOb-5's
characteristics; look to state law to see how lOb-5 fits into state scheme; apply statute which
most dosely resembles 10b-5); Schulman, Statutes of Limitations in 10b-5 Actions: Complication
Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 635, 640 (1967) (federal law determines elements of
10b-5; state law locates element that mates most auspiciously with federal claim); Statutes Of
Limitations, supra note 19, at 1162 (federal law determines nature of 10b-5 claim; forum state
law reveals how it fits into state scheme); see Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 635 (9th Cir.
1953) (using state law to analyze various state statutes); Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212, 1215-16, 1218 (D. Minn. 1973) (using state law to determine elements
of state causes of action and federal law for 1Ob-5); Gilbert v. Meyer, 362 F. Supp. 168, 172-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (federal law determines parameters of i0b-5); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor
& Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177, 183-84 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (state law determines what types of cases
fit within various state statutes of limitations); cf. Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338, 344 (2d Cir.
1970) (other Exchange Act remedies; look to state court interpretations of state statutes to see
where federal daim fits).
The resemblance test basically requires a common purpose for lOb-5 and the state
remedy, and a similarity of the elements of, and defenses to, the two causes of action.
Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212, 1218-19; see Nickels v.
Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 804, 808 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (same subject, same goals and
underlying policy).
62 Denny v. Performance Sys., Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,387, at 91,983 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
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not "unusually long,' '63 although the one-year period used in some
forums64 could easily be considered "unusually short." Second, the
period for 10b-5 should be at least as long as the forum's period for
common-law fraud.65 Third, some authorities generally favor short
time spans,6 6 while others tend toward longer ones.6 7
The various tests have not produced a uniform statutory
period. The differences arise from two sources. First, courts have
not consistently selected the same kind of state law. They have
drawn the limitations periods from statutes dealing with common-
law fraud,68 blue sky laws,69 "catch-all" provisions,7 0 and even from a
personal action in trespass71 and action on the case. 2 Second, the
period for a specific type of state statute varies among the fifty states.
Courts therefore adopt different periods for 1 Ob-5 cases arising in
different jurisdictions: 73 Alabama (1 year);7 4 Arkansas (2 years);75
California (3 years);7 6 Colorado (3 years);7 7 Connecticut (2 or 3
63 Id.
"' See notes 74-106 and accompanying text infra regarding those states supplying a
one-year period.
63 Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc.,
352 F. Supp. 66, 76 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (N.D. Tex.
1972); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177, 182-83 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
But see Josef's of Palm Peach, Inc. v. Southern Inv. Co., 349 F. Supp. 1057, 1060-61 (S.D. Fla.
1972) (not following Azalea, supra).
6 Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 804, 808 (N.D. Ohio 1975);
Hitchcock v. deBruyne, 377 F. Supp. 1403, 1407 (D. Conn. 1974); Klapmeier v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212, 1217 (D. Minn. 1973); Kramer v. Loewi & Co,-,
357 F. Supp. 83, 86 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1178, 1190 (W.D.
Ark. 1969), rev'd, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
67 Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1362 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975);
United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1973); Statutes OJ Limitations, supra
note 19, at 1161-62; cf. Weinberger v. New York Stock Exch., 335 F. Supp. 139, 145 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
66 E.g., Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut (split of opinion), District of Colum-
bia, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio
(split of opinion), Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Washington. For relevant authority, see notes
79-105 infra.
69 E.g., Arkansas, Connecticut (split of opinion), Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Ohio (split of
opinion), Virginia, and Wisconsin. For relevant authority, see notes 75-106 infra.
70 E.g., Tennessee. See note 101 infra.
71 Pennsylvania is such a state. For authority, see note 99 infra.
72 Delaware is such a jurisdiction. See note 79 infra.
73 The following jurisdictions lack authority: Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wyoming.
74 Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1246 (5th Cir. 1971); Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 205 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
75 Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1237-40 (8th Cir. 1970).
76 United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 1973); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1970); Sackett v. Beaman, 399 F.2d 884, 890 (9th
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years);7 8 Delaware (3 years);79 District of Columbia (3 years); 80
Florida (2 years);8' Georgia (4 years); 2 Idaho (3 years);83 Illinois (3
years);84 Indiana (6 years); 85 Iowa (2 years); 86 Kansas (2 years);87
Kentucky (5 years);8 8 Louisiana (1 year);8 9 Maine (2 years);90 Mary-
land (unclear); 91 Massachusetts (2 years);92 Michigan (6 years);93
Minnesota (6 years); 94 New York (the later of 6 years after violation,
and 2 years after discovery or the time plaintiff should have discov-
ered); 95 Ohio (2 or 4 years); 96 Oklahoma (2 years);97 Oregon (2
Cir. 1968); Turner v. Lundquist, 377 F.2d 44, 46 (9th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Guaranty Serv.
Corp., 51 F.R.D. 289, 295 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
1 deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 1971), modifying 286
F. Supp. 809, 813 (D. Colo. 1968).
78 Compare Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per
cur/am, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir.), decision adhered to, 430 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1970) (three years), with
Hitchcock v. de Bruyne, 377 F. Supp. 1403, 1405, 1407 (D. Conn. 1974) (two years).
9 Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 327-28 (D.
Del. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957).
80 National Realty Trust v. Neelon Mgmt. Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,049, at 94,226-27 (D.D.C. 1973); Conlon v. University Computing Co.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,796 at 93,440 (D.D.C. 1973).
" Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1974); O'Connell v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 994,995 (5th
Cir. 1974).
82 Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177, 184 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
83 Cf Sharp v. Idaho Inv. Corp., 95 Idaho 113, 504 P.2d 386 (1972) (1933 Act § 17(a)).
84 Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1291, 1294 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 1682 (1976); Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1974); Parrent v. Midwest Rug
Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1972).
" Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993,997 (7th Cir. 1969).But see Corey v. Bache & Co., 355
F. Supp. 1123, 1125-26 (S.D.W. Va. 1973) (two years).
88 In re Alodex Corp. Sec. Litigation, 392 F. Supp. 672, 679 (S.D. Iowa 1975).
87 Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 714, 716 (D. Kan. 1974); Trussell v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801, 803 (D. Colo. 1964).
88 Dudley v. Allen, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,273, at
91,587 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
89 Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F. Supp. 389, 391 (E.D. La. 1968).
90 Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 906 (D. Me. 1971).
9' No authority controls cases that arise after 1968. For causes of action arising prior to
1968, the courts split as to whether a two-year or a three-year period applies. Compare Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 343 F. Supp. 245, 251 (D. Md. 1972); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F.
Supp. 128, 143 (D. Md. 1968),modified, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969),cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037
(1970) (both using three-year period), with Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 55 F.R.D. 557, 562-63 (D.
Md. 1972) and Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.. 553, 558 (D. Md. 1971) (two-year period).
92 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Collins
v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (D. Mass. 1972).
" Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967); Kelly v. West Printing Co.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,835, at 96,808 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
" Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212, 1217-18 (D. Minn.
1973).
" E.g., Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972); Klein v. Auchincloss,
Parker & Redpath, 436 F.2d 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1971).
96 Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 804, 808 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (two
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years); 98 Pennsylvania (6 years); 99 South Dakota (6 years); 100 Tennes-
see (10 years); 1 1 Texas (2 years);10  Utah (3 years);' 03 Virginia (2
years); 10 4 Washington (3 years); 10 5 and Wisconsin (3 years).'0 6
Complications follow if the forum state changes its law. The
forum's legislature might enact a new cause of action after a federal
court adopts a period from an existing cause of action. This presents
no problem if the statute to which federal courts looked in the past
satisfies the applicable tests'0 7 better than the new statute. But even
when the reverse is true, courts have properly refrained from adopt-
ing the time span associated with the new cause of action.'08 Their
refusal to change is partly based on the reliance prospective litigants
place on the old period. A forum state might also amend its law to
increase or decrease the statutory period that the federal courts had
adopted as the lOb-5 standard. Federal courts should then use the
old period for causes of action arising before the effective date of
years); Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye, 392 F. Supp. 484, 490-91 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (four years);
Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 63-64 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685
(6th Cir. 1960) (four years).
97 Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171 (10th Cir.
1974).98 Winkelman v. Blyth & Co., 394 F. Supp. 994, 996 (D. Ore. 1973); Speros v. Nelson,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,791, at 93,426 (D. Ore. 1973);
Hoffert v. E.F. Hinkle & Co., 56 F.R.D. 395, 398-401 (D. Ore. 1972).
99 Tober v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74, 84 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F.
Supp. 1174, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
100 Bangs, Rule 10b-5 and the South Dakota Lawyer, 14 S.D.L. REv. 56, 63 (1969) (based on
fraud statute).
101 Denny v. Performance Sys., Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP'.
93,387, at 91,981 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
102 Aboussie v. Aboussie, 441 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1971) (assumption of parties);
Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1107 (S.D. Tex. 1970). Contra, Richardson v. Salinas, 336
F. Supp. 997, 1001 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (three year blue sky law; not citing Aboussie, supra).
103 Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975);
Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 39 (10th Cir. 1971); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 466 F.2d 90, 103-04 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), cert. denied sub nom.
Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Chiodo v. General Waterworks
Corp., 380 F.2d 860, 867 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004 (1967).
104 Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1280 (W.D. Va. 1973); Maine v. Leonard, 353
F. Supp. 968, 970 (W.D. Va. 1973). Contra, Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp.
836, 844 (E.D. Va. 1968) (five-year fraud provision).
105 Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1971); Errion v.
Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1956); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 634-35 (9th Cir.
1953).
106 Kramer v. Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83, 86-87 & n.6 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
107 See notes 51-65 and accompanying text supra.
'0 See United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1004 (1973); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1971)
(favoring old statute because better choice and reluctant to change). See also Collins v. Rukin,
342 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (D. Mass. 1972) (harsh to plaintiffs to change from state law to 1933
Act § 13).
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the amendment, and the amended period for claims arising on or
after that date. 10 9 Another type of change occurs when a district
court applies a different period from what its court of appeals
establishes in a later suit. If the first case is still pending, the district
judge should modify his holding." 0
All of this is needlessly complicated. Congress should enact a
statute of limitations for 1 Ob-5 similar -to the one federal courts
adopt from New York State: the later of six years after the cause of
action arose and two years after the plaintiff discovered or should
have discovered the fraud with due diligence."' Congress has al-
ready acted similarly in the antitrust field. 12
B. When the Period Begins to Run
The commencement of the statute of limitations period de-
pends on two elements: (1) when the plaintiff's cause of action
accrued (for the period cannot start prior to that time); and (2)
whether the period begins before the plaintiff discovered or should
have discovered the fraud.
State law establishes the standard for when a cause of action
accrues," 3 but federal law applies those criteria." 4 For example,
under New York law a claim arises when the plaintiff first becomes
entitled to maintain the suit in question." 5 Using that standard,
109 See In re Alodex Corp. Sec. Litigation, 392 F. Supp. 672, 680-81 (S.D. Iowa 1975);
Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364, 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (relying on
N.Y.G.P.L.R. § 218(b) (McKinney 1972), a transition provision); Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212, 1219 n.10 (D. Minn. 1973) (based on state transition
provision); Kramer v. Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83, 87-88 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Hutton, 343 F. Supp. 245, 251 (D. Md. 1972), modifled, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553, 559 (D. Md. 1971);
Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1180 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); (claims barred before
amendment, if at all).Butsee Rickel v. Levy, 370 F. Supp. 751,754 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Gilbert
v. Meyer, 362 F. Supp. 168, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Shapiro v. Schwamm, 279 F. Supp. 798, 801
n.3, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
110 See Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1294 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 1682 (1976).
1 See Statutes Of Limitations, supra note 19, at 117; Schulman, supra note 61, at 649.
112 The special law adopting a statute of limitations for certain antitrust actions is now 15
U.S.C. § 15b (1970).
10 See Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Saylor v. Lindsley, 302
F. Supp. 1174, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Statutes Of Limitations, supra note 19, at 1162. For a
discussion of other cases, see Norte & Co. v. Krock, f 1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 92,295, at 97,409 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
1"' See Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Janigan v. Taylor, 344
F.2d 781, 784 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174,
1179, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Norte & Co. v. Krock, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 92,295, at 97,409 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"5 See Norte & Co. v. Krock, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,295, at 97,409 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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federal law then determines if the plaintiff has acquired sufficient
rights to bring a 10b-5 action. 116 For multi-stepped schemes, an
integration concept sometimes governs the time of accrual. If one or
more acts are part of a common plan, 1 7 the statute does not com-
mence until the scheme's last act is completed.' 8 On the other hand,
the statute commences before the last action if the acts are a.series of
independent breaches or merely lull the plaintiff after the fraud. 1 9
Once a cause of action has accrued, federal law determines
when the period begins to run. 20 The general rule is that the temporal
period, adopted from the forum's law, begins when the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the fraud. '21 This principle is sometimes called
116 See id.
117 See A. JACOBS § 115.02.
118 See Goldberg v. National Bank of N. America, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,555, 't 98,531-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Lockwood, Corporate Acquisitions and
Actions Under Sections 10(b) and 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 Bus. LAw. 365,
374-75 (1968) (contingent payout acquisition).
"1 See Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1972).
120 See Tomera v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 1975); Hudak v. Economic Research
Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 1000 n.5 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975);
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758 (5th Cir. 1974); United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481
F.2d 1012, 1014 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 441
F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1971); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226 (10th
Cir. 1970); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir. 1970); Azalea Meats, Inc. v.
Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Winkelman v. Blyth & Co., 394 F. Supp. 994, 996 (D.
Ore. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975); Maine v. Leonard,
365 F. Supp. 1277, 1280 (W.D. Va. 1973); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Corp., 336 F.
Supp. 890,906 (D. Me. 1971); Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553, 558 (D. Md. 1971).But
see Turner v. Lundquist, 377 F.2d 44, 46 (9th Cir. 1967) (using forum's law); Ericksen v.
Winnebago Indus., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (D. Minn. 1972); (law of state of issuer's
incorporation determines whether stockholder has constructive notice of articles of incorpora-
tion).
121 See Schaefer v. First Natl Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1295-96 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 1682 (1976); Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1119 (7th Cir. 1974), revrd on
other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976); Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1974); Dzenits
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171 (10th Cir. 1974) ("actual or
constructive discovery of the fraud"); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912, 917 (4th
Cir. 1973),modifying 343 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1972),cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (19.74) (actually
discovered or should have discovered with reasonable diligence); United Cal. Bank v. Salik,
481 F.2d 1012, 1014 n.7, 1015 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973) ("the fraud is, or
should be, discovered"); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1972);
Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 39 (10th Cir. 1971) (discovered or'should have
discovered fraud); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 441 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1971) ("actual knowledge
or notice of facts which in the exercise of due diligence would have led to actual knowledge");
Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1971) (not "before the
plaintiff reasonably could discover the violation"); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233,
1240 (8th Cir. 1970) ("until the fraud is, or should be, discovered"); Saylor v. Lindsley, 391
F.2d 965, 970 (2d Cir. 1968) (discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, "the facts
which give rise to the action"); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 879 (1965); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 244 F.2d 902, 903 (3d
Cir. 1957) (discovered or could have discovered with due diligence), aff'g 143 F. Supp. 323,
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the federal tolling doctrine. Because the doctrine delays all time
periods, it lessens the forum shopping that stems from the variety of
state-derived lOb-5 limitation periods. 12 2 Even if the state statute
specifies that the period commences on the date of the transaction, a
judge in a lOb-5 case will apply the federal tolling doctrine while
adopting the state's statutory time period. 123 This period therefore
starts when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud.
However, when state law itself contains a tolling rule similar to the
federal tolling doctrine, does state or federal law determine when
the plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud? Federal law
should control this issue, 124 although many cases hold differently. 25
The Supreme Court first announced the federal tolling doc-
trine in the 1875 bankruptcy case of Bailey v. Glover.'2 6 The Court
held that
where the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it
without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar
of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered,
though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of
328-31 (D. Del. 1956); Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston & Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 830, 832
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (starts when have "constructive knowledge of sufficient facts to recognize the
fraud"; begin at earlier of actual discovery and constructive discovery); Schilleci v. Guaranty
Say. Life Ins. Co., 367 F. Supp. 903, 904 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (discovered, or in exercise of due
diligence should have discovered "facts putting him on notice of the alleged fraud");
Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364, 1372-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Klein v. Spear,
Leeds & Kellogg, 306 F. Supp. 743, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp.
1174, 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
122 See 70 HARV. L. REv. 566, 568 (1957).
12' See Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965, 970 (2d Cir. 1968); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d
781, 783-84 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston & Beane
Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp.
1364, 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Saemann v. Everest & Jennings, Int'l, 343 F. Supp. 457, 460
(N.D. Il1. 1972); Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553, 558-59 (D. Md. 1971); Saylor v.
Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
124 See Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 44, 47 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Tober v.
Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74, 84 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
125 Klein v. Shields &" Co., 470 F.2d 1344, 1346-47 (2d Cir. 1972); Chiodo v. General
Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860, 867 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004 (1967); National
Realty Trust v. Neelon Mgmt. Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,049,
at 94,227 (D.D.C. 1973); Conlon v. University Computing Co., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,796, at 93,442 (D.D.C. 1973); Dudley v. Allen, [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'. 93,273, at 91,587 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Stevens v.
Abbott, Proctor& Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 844 (E.D. Va. 1968); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat,
246 F. Supp. 780, 783 (S.D. Fla. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967);
Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 967 (N.D. 111. 1952); see
Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1956) (seeming to use state statute); Klein v.
Adams & Peck, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,778, at 93,390
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (apparently relying on state statute).
126 88 U.S. 342 (1875).
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the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge
of the other party.
.[V]hen there has been no negligence or laches on the part
of a plaintiff in coming to the knowledge of the fraud which is the
foundation of the suit, and when the fraud has been concealed, or
is of such a character as to conceal itself, the statute does not begin
to run until the fraud is discovered by, or becomes known to, the
party suing, or those in privity with him.'27
Based in part on this direction, most lOb-5 decisions permit a plain-
tiff to invoke the federal tolling doctrine even though the defen-
dants did not actively or fraudulently conceal their acts.' 28 The
minority and less well-reasoned view requires fraudulent or active
concealment; 129 proof of a lOb-5 breach does not ipso facto show
such concealment. 30 Under either approach, fraudulent and active
concealment alone does not toll the statute.' 3 ' The federal tolling
doctrine applies even if the state statute of limitations does not
contain a tolling provision, 3 2 and applies when federal common law
or state law does not classify the activities that constitute a 1Ob-5
breach as fraud, 33 the defendant is primarily or secondarily li-
able, 134 or the limitations period is not adopted from the state statute
127 Id. at 348-50 (footnote omitted).
'28 deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1970) (quoting
Bailey); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1969) (quoting Baiey, but adding that
"defendant's use of the statute must be repugnant to justice"); Klein v. Spear, Leeds &
Kellogg, 306 F. Supp. 743, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("need not prove active concealment");
Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 328-29 (D. Del. 1956),
aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957) (concealment by defendants only one factor).
12 Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1975) (probably overruling sub silentio
Seventh Circuit authority cited in note 128 supra); Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston & Beane Inc.,
372 F. Supp. 821, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Puttkammer v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Co., 365 F. Supp.
495, 497 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (required either fraud or fraudulent concealment required);
Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 350 F. Supp. 1122, 1125 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd, 503 F.2d
364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 246 F. Supp. 780,
783 (S.D. Fla. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967).
130 Puttkammer v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Co., 365 F. Supp. 495, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
131 Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (W.D. Va. 1973).
1M2 See note 123 and accompanying text supra.
133 See Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364, 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(applies to actual fraud and constructive fraud). Contra, Schulman, supra note 61, at 639, 642
n.42 (toll only if fraud or active concealment; unclear if state or federal law determines
existence of cause of action for fraud); Statutes Of Limitations, supra note 19, at 1161 (suit based
on fraud or active concealment required).
134 See Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1296 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 1682 (1976); Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1119 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 365, 375-76
(7th Cir. 1974).
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for common-law fraud. 135 The federal tolling doctrine is employed
whether the Rule is considered legal or equitable.' 36
A plaintiff "knows" of a fraud when he has actual knowledge (1)
that the statements made were false, that material facts were omit-
ted, or that other acts constituting a lOb-5 breach existed, and (2)
that the defendant acted with the requisite degree of scienter1 37
Actual knowledge of these facts is not enough if the plaintiff cannot
perceive the fraud because he mistakenly believes other facts are
true.13 8 However, the plaintiff need not realize the legal conclusion
that the actions violated 10b-5. Unless the plaintiff admits knowl-
edge or is shown to have received actual notice, a defendant as a
practical matter will have great difficulty proving that the plaintiff
"knew" of the facts.
Authorities are split on whether a subjective or objective stan-
dard determines constructive knowledge (i.e., whether the plaintiff
should have known of the fraud). Following a subjective ap-
proach, 39 the better-reasoned cases impute constructive knowledge
only if the particular plaintiff (with all his foibles and sophistication)
should have known the facts.' 40 Other decisions adopt an objective
standard, holding that a claimant has constructive knowledge if a
reasonable man in his position should have known the facts, even
though he is so naive or unsophisticated that he would not have
discovered them.14
1
"' See Douglass v.Glenn E. Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1971). But see
Schulman, supra note 61, at 642 (use federal tolling if fraud statute of limitations and
affirmative concealment).
136 Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir. 1970); Morgan v. Koch, 419
F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1969); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 879 (1965); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364, 1372-73 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F. Supp. 389, 392 (E.D. La. 1968).
' Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 55 F.R.D. 557, 563 (D. Md. 1972).
138 See Kramer v. Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83, 87 n.4 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
13 For convenience, the subjective approach is assumed correct in the rest of this section.
Thus, when discussing due diligence, reference is made to the plaintiff rather than to a
reasonable man.
140 Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 172 (10th Cir.
1974) ("plaintiff or a person in plaintiff's position"); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d
1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1970) (seems to use subjective standard); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422
F.2d 1233, 1241 (8th Cir. 1970); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 10 (5th Cir. 1967)
("state of mind" of plaintiff); Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (W.D. Va. 1973)
(man of plaintiff's experience and sophistication); cf. Bahlman, supra note 11, at 774 n.192
(laches may bar sophisticated but not naive plaintiff).
"' See Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1974); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton,
488 F.2d 912, 917 (4th Cir. 1973), modifying 343 F. Supp. 245, 251, 253 (D. Md. 1972), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974) (using reasonable man standard for facts that should raise
suspicions); Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860, 867 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1004 (1967) (relying on Utah law); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica
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Under both the subjective and the objective approach, a two-
step process determines when a plaintiff "should have known" the
facts:
First, whether the circumstances surrounding the sale of the stock
and the knowledge available to [the plaintiff] were sufficient to put
a man of his experience and sophistication on notice, or to raise
the suspicion of fraud in his mind. Secondly, if the suspicion arose
or should reasonably have arisen, whether [the plaintiff] exercised
reasonable diligence under the circumstances to discover the al-
leged fraud. 142
Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 an early Dela-
ware district court case, highlighted the difference in the quantum
of proof required by each step:
What on the one hand is tantamount to an actual discovery of
fraud should not be confused with what on the other carries a
duty to investigate. It is impossible to lay down any general rule as
to the amount of evidence or number or nature of evidential facts
admitting discovery of fraud. But, facts in the sense of indisputa-
ble proof or any proof at all, are different from facts calculated to
excite inquiry which impose a duty of reasonable diligence and
which, if pursued, would disclose the fraud. Facts in the latter
sense merely constitute objects of direct experience and, as such,
may comprise rumors or vague charges if of sufficient substance
to arouse suspicion. 144
The initial stage of this two-step process analyzes whether the
plaintiff acquired a suspicion of fraud. Suspicions arise only if the
plaintiff has actual knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on notice.
Corp., 244 F.2d 902, 904 (3d Cir. 1957); Winkelman v. Blythe & Co., 394 F. Supp. 994, 996
(D. Ore. 1973); Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston & Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 832 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Speros v. Nelson, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]CGH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,791, at
93,426 (D. Ore. 1973) (quotingHoffert, infra); Hoffert v. E.F. Hinkle & Co., 56 F.R.D. 395,400
(D. Ore. 1972) ("reasonably prudent person, similarly situated").
142 Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (W.D. Va. 1973); accord, Hupp v. Gray,
500 F.2d 993, 996-97 (7th Cir. 1974) (raised suspicion or curiosity); Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Hutton, 488 F.2d 912,917 (4th Cir. 1973),modifying 343 F. Supp. 245,253,258 (D. Md. 1972),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974) (do not need full and complete knowledge; sufficient if facts
cause reasonable man to inquire); Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 674 (D. Md. 1975)
(actual knowledge or notice); In re Alodex Corp. Sec. Litigation, 392 F. Supp. 672, 684 (S.D.
Iowa 1975) (sufficient to place plaintiff "on notice"); Mittendorfv. J.R. Williston & Beane Inc.,
372 F. Supp. 821, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Josef's of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Southern Inv. Co., 349
F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D. Fla. 1972) ("notice of facts which, in itheexercise of due diligence,
would have led to actual knowledge of the violation"); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin.
Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177, 184 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (similar toJosef's, supra).
143 143 F. Supp. 323 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957).
144 143 F. Supp. at 331; accord, deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226
(10th Cir. 1970); Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (W.D. Va. 1973). But see Weiser
v. Shwartz, 286 F. Supp. 389, 392 (E.D. La. 1968).
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If suspicions are not aroused, the plaintiff has no duty to investigate,
and the statute of limitations never begins to run under the con-
structive knowledge branch of the federal tolling doctrine. 45 Once a
suspicion of fraud arises, the second step of the analysis questions
whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to uncover the
fraud.146 When a plaintiff is not duly diligent, the statutory period
commences at the time he would have discovered the facts with
reasonable diligence.' 4 7 The period never begins, however, if the
plaintiff could not have discovered the facts with due diligence, even
though he may have exercised little or no diligence. 14 In contrast, a
plaintiff might earnestly try to investigate his suspicions. In that
event, either the period commences when he discovers the facts, or
the period never starts because the facts were not sufficiently discov-
erable. 14 9
The reasonableness of the plaintiff's investigation does not af-
fect a determination of what facts he must discover before the
statute begins to run. The requisite amount of proof has been
expressed in different ways. Courts will not await leisurely discovery
of the full details; 150 the plaintiff must be aware of the acts constitut-
ing the IOb-5 breach and must know that the defendant acted with
the necessary scienter;15 1 and the claimant must be able to recognize
the fraud or at least its possibility. 152
M See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 343 F. Supp. 245, 258, 260 (D. Md. 1972),
modifled, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
'4' As to whether the standard of diligence is "reasonableness" with respect to the
individual plaintiff, or as to a reasonable man, see notes 134-36 and accompanying textsupra.
147 But see Friedlander v. Feinberg, 369 F. Supp. 917, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 508 F.2d
836 (2d Cir. 1975) (period commences when plaintiff receives notice of fraud); Maine v.
Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (W.D. Va. 1973) (period starts when plaintiff receives
notice).
148 See Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston & Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(date of actual discovery or date when should have been discovered with reasonable diligence);
A. JACOBS § 63 n.45 (defendant's due diligence), § 64.01[b][ii] n.72 (plaintiff's subjective
reliance), and accompanying texts; note 291 and actompanying text infra (estoppel). See also
Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 1969), quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. (9
Otto) 135, 140, 143 (1879) ("There must be reasonable diligence;" "the means of knowledge
are the same thing in effect as knowledge itself.").
'4' See Saemann v. Everest & Jennings, Int'l, 343 F. Supp. 457, 460 (N.D. Il. 1972) (if
cannot discover with due diligence, period does not begin until actual discovery).
"' See Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1974); Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d
1344, 1347 (2d Cir. 1972); Turner v. Lundquist, 377 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir. 1967) (no need to
discover all details); In re Alodex Corp. Sec. Litigation, 392 F. Supp. 672, 684 (S.D: Iowa
1975); Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston & Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Friedlander v. Feinberg, 369 F. Supp. 917, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Maine v. Leonard, 365 F.
Supp. 1277, 1281, 1286 (W.D. Va. 1973); Klein v. Adams & Peck, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,778, at 93;391 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. Klein v. Bower, 421
F.2d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1970) (other Exchange Act provisions).
"5 See note 147 and accompanying text supra.
"2 See Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344, 1347 (2d Cir. 1972); Mittendorf v. J.R.
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Under either the objective or the subjective approach, the fed-
eral tolling doctrine bristles with fact issues: 153 Did the plaintiff have
actual knowledge of the facts?154 Were suspicions raised in his
mind?1 55 Was he duly diligent? 56 When did he discover sufficient
facts to start the period running?15 7 Could he have discovered the
facts with due diligence? 58 A court will impute to a plaintiff the
actual or constructive knowledge of his agent, 59 even if the agent
does not convey the facts to him.
A variety of factors weigh in determining whether a plaintiff
held suspicions and made a duly diligent investigation. Among those
factors which may apply in any one situation are: the plaintiff's
Williston & Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 830-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Friedlander v. Feinberg,
369 F. Supp. 917, 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 508 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1975); Klein v. Adams &
Peck, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,778, at 93,391 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
153 See e.g., Tomera v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1975) (limitations issues);
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1119 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 96 S.
Ct. 1375 (1976) (whether plaintiff knew or should have known); Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 172 (10th Cir. 1974) (constructive knowledge);
Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240-41 (8th Cir. 1970) (when should have discovered
fraud); Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965, 970 (2d Cir. 1968) (when discovered or should have
discovered fraud); Friedlander v. Feinberg, 369 F. Supp. 917, 918-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd,
508 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1975) (when should have discovered fraud); Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc.,
64 F.R.D. 714,716 (D. Kan. 1974) (federal tolling); Puttkammer v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Co., 365
F. Supp. 495,.498 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (whether defendant fraudulently concealed truth); Tober v.
Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74, 84 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (when discovered or should have discovered
fraud); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 907 (D. Me. 1971) (when
plaintiff recognized, or should have recognized facts); Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553,
559 (D. Md. 1971); Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 306 F. Supp. 743, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Shapiro v. Schwamm, 279 F. Supp. 798, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (when plaintiff discovered the
fraud). The time of the discovery of fraud remains a fact issue even if due diligence is
measured by an'objective standard. Hoffert v. E.F. Hinkle & Co., 56 F.R.D. 395, 400 (D. Ore.
1972).
154 Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 44, 47 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
155 deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir. 1970),modifying 286
F. Supp. 809, 813 (D. Colo. 1968).
156 SeeJohns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912,918 (4th Cir. 1973),modifying 343 F.
Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386
F.2d 5, 9-10 (5th Cir. 1967); Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 674 (D. Md. 1975); Rickel
v. Levy, 370 F. Supp. 751, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1281
(W.D. Va. 1973); Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 55 F.R.D. 557, 563-64 (D. Md. 1972).
157 Cf Handelman v. Weiss, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,749, at 96,482-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (1933 Act § 12).
158 However, a reasonable man standard determines this issue for class actions. Seiffer v.
Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 714, 719 (D. Kan. 1974).
159 In re Alodex Corp. Sec. Litigation, 392 F. Supp. 672, 682 n.3 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (impute
husband's knowledge to wife); Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston & Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821,
830 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("plaintiff or his counsel"); see Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 350 (1875)
("the party suing, or those in privity with him"). As to the process and limitations of imputing
knowledge, see A. JACOBS § 64.01[b][ii] n.59 (subjective reliance), § 118.01 nn.13-16 (decep-
tion in mismanagement cases) and accompanying texts.
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sophistication; 160 his access to information; '61 the amount of money
he invested; 162 his knowledge of related lawsuits; 163 any fiduciary
relationship between plaintiff and defendant; 64 plaintiffs trust in
defendant; 65 whether the corporation issued the misleading state-
ment; 166 the nature of the fraud; 67 whether the acts constituting the
breach were hidden or practiced convincingly; 68 how widely the
offending acts were publicized; 169 plaintiffs opportunity to detect
the fraud; 170 defendant's lulling activities;' 7 ' and position in the
160 Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 172 (10th Cir.
1974); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1970); In re Alodex
Corp. Sec. Litigation, 392 F. Supp. 672, 683 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Maine v. Leonard, 365 F.
Supp. 1277, 1281 (W.D. Va. 1973); Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F. Supp. 389, 393 (E.D. La. 1968);
Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 331 (D. Del. 1956),
aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957). This factor applies only under a subjective approach.
161 See A. JAcoBs § 64.01[b][ii] n.27 and accompanying text (subjective reliance).
162 See id. § 64.01[b][ii] n.35 and accompanying text (subjective reliance).
163 deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1970); Maine v.
Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (W.D. Va. 1973); Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F. Supp. 389, 393
(E.D. La. 1968); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 331
(D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957).
164 Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1974) (one factor but not controlling);
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 1970); Azalea Meats, Inc.
v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 9 (5th Cir. 1967); Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (W.D. Va.
1973); Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 44, 47 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Tobacco & Allied
Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 331 (D. Del. 1956), affd, 244 F.2d 902
(3d Cir. 1957); see Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1969).
16' Racine v. Essex Wire Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,746, at 99,248 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 844
(E.D. Va. 1968).
'66 deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir. 1970) (corporate
statement requires less due diligence).
167 Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1974); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993,997
(7th Cir. 1969).
16' deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1970); Azalea
Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 9 (5th Cir. 1967); Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277,
1281 (W.D. Va. 1973); Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F. Supp. 389, 393 (E.D. La. 1968); Tobacco &
Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323,329, 331 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 244
F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957).
"I Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 1969); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386
F.2d 5, 9 (5th Cir. 1967).
'70 Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1974); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.,
435 F.2d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1970); Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (W.D. Va.
1973); Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F. Supp. 389, 393 (E.D. La. 1968); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc.
v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 331 (D. Del. 1956), affid, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir.
1957).
'r Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1974); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447,
455-56 (9th Cir. 1956); Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 55 F.R.D. 557, 563 (D. Md. 1972). Factors
occurring after the breach can determine whether suspicions were raised or the plaintiff was
duly diligent. But none of this permits a plaintiff to prosecute a suit if the statutory period ran
before the lulling activities commenced. Cf Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp.
1104, 1108 (D. Mass. 1974) (1933 Act §§ 5, 13).
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industry. 172 Some of these factors are considered when a plaintiff
proves subjective reliance 7 3 or a defendant demonstrates due dili-
gence.'7 4 But the due diligence that the federal tolling doctrine
requires of the plaintiff is a different concept. Authorities dealing
with the other two issues therefore do not control the commence-
ment of the limitations period.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that his actions satisfy
the federal tolling doctrine. 7 5 Nonetheless, the better-reasoned
cases do not require a complaint to assert that the plaintiff was duly
diligent or to set forth the time and circumstances of the discovery of
fraud.176
In a multi-defendant suit, the time period as to each particular
defendant begins when the plaintiff discovers facts relating to that
defendant. Consequently, the limitations period for one defendant
may expire before the period for other defendants. 77 The federal
tolling doctrine does not delay the statute of limitations for pendent
state claims.178
C. Tolling the Statute of Limitations
Certain events toll the statute of limitations. The period does
not start to run if one of these events exists when the statute would
172 deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1970); Maine v.
Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (W.D. Va. 1973); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Trans-
america Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 331 (D. Del. 1956), affd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957).
173 See A. JACOBS § 64.01[b][ii] nn.24-42, 73 and accompanying text.
'74 See id. at § 63 nn.43-44 and accompanying text.
175 Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1974); Schilleci v. Guaranty Say. Life Ins.
Co., 367 F. Supp. 903, 904 (N.D. Ala. 1973); Puttkammer v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Co., 365 F.
Supp. 495, 498 (N.D. 111. 1973); Saemann v. Everest & Jennings, Int'l, 343 F. Supp. 457, 460
(N.D. Ill. 1972); see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1268
(4th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff has burden of proving reasonable dispatch to obtain rescission); Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912, 916 n.12 (4th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff must prove he
acted promptly to get rescission). In those cases which require fraudulent concealment to
invoke the federal tolling doctrine (see note 137 and accompanying text supra), the plaintiff
must also prove the fraudulent concealment. Puttkammer v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Co., 365 F.
Supp. 495, 498.
176 Turner v. Lundquist, 377 F.2d 44,48 (9th Cir. 1967); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton,
343 F. Supp. 245, 262 (D. Md. 1972), modified, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 916 (1974); Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1107 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Premier Indus.,
Inc. v. Delaware Valley Financial Corp., 185 F. Supp. 694, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1960). Contra, Klein v.
Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 306 F. Supp. 743, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F.
Supp. 1174, 1183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mooney v. Vitolo, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,116, at 96,549 (S.D.N.Y 1967) ("affirmatively plead facts which show
that the statute of limitations has not run"); Prager v. Robbins Music Corp., [1961-1964
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,367, at 94,548 (S.D.N.Y 1964).
177 Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1298 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
1682 (1976).
178 See Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230,237
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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otherwise commence. If such an event happens after the period
begins, the period is suspended for the duration of the event. For
example, filing a class action suspends the limitations period while
that suit is pending. 79 Thus, if a purported class action is filed on
January 2 and the court decides on the following October 2 not to
certify that class, the intervening period extends the time during
which members of the purported class must bring suit. 180 Instituting
a class action does not toll the period for, or resurrect the claims of,
those class members whom the statute of limitations had barred
when the complaint was filed.' 8 ' A plaintiff's individual suit brought
in state court does not toll the period. 182
Section 11 (e) of the Bankruptcy Act'83 provides another type of
tolling. That section permits a trustee in bankruptcy to sue on any
cause of action existing when the petition in bankruptcy was filed, as
long as the suit is commenced within two years from the date of
adjudication.'84 The statutory period is also tolled while the wrong-
doers adversely dominate a defrauded corporation. 85
The plaintiff and defendant may contractually agree to extend
the period of limitations. Tolling agreements are usually executed
when the statute is about to expire and the parties are negotiating
179 Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 n.15 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928
(1969); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 411, 416-17 (S.D. Iowa 1975)
(probably toll; no class action, but intervention permitted for 30 days); Rickel v. Levy, 370 F.
Supp. 751, 760 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (tolled until final decision); Hellerstein v. Mather, 360 F.
Supp. 473, 474-75 (D. Colo. 1973); Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 34 n.5 (S.D.
Iowa 1972); Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Comment, Individual
Recovery for Promoter's Fraud--Procedural Problems Under S.E.C. Rule lOb-5, 51 CALIF. L. REv.
939, 946 n.48 (1963); Comment, Spurious Class Actions Based Upon Securities Frauds Under the
Revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 295, 308-09 (1966); Statutes Of
Limitations, supra note 19, at 1160 n.42; cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 181
(1974) (dissenting opinion).
ISO Hellerstein v. Mather, 360 F. Supp. 473, 474-75 (D. Colo. 1973).
I'l Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 34 n.5 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
18'2 Sackett v. Beaman, 399 F.2d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 1968); see Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422
F.2d 1233, 1241 (8th Cir. 1970).
183 11 U.S.C. § 29(e) (1966).
184 Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1247 (5th Cir. 1971); Hooper v. Moun-
tain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961);
Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1106-07 (S.D. Tex. 1970). The two year period does not
run until the fraud was or should have been discovered. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec.
Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 206.
185 Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1246-47 (5th Cir. 1971); Saylor v.
Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (defendants need "a full, complete and
exclusive control" of corporation); see Dudley v. Allen, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,273, at 91,587 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
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settlement. Tolling agreements should be valid,8 6 although in a
different context the Supreme Court has cast some doubt on their
enforceability. 1 7
Every 10b-5 case involving the statute of limitations poses the
issue of whether commencement of the suit stops the limitations
period. This is an issue of federal law. Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the plaintiff need only file the complaint within the
period, even though he does not serve one or more defendants
before the period expires.18 8 Federal law also governs counterclaims
and relation-back of amendments to the original complaint. 8 9
II
LACHES
The Ninth Circuit, in Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,1 90 de-
scribed the affirmative defense of laches as
(1) a lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is
asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense....
Where these elements are present, the damage to the party assert-
ing the defense is caused by his detrimental reliance on his adver-
sary's conduct.19 1
186 See Butterman v. Steiner, 343 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1965); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also In re Alodex
Corp. Sec. Litigation, 392 F. Supp. 672, 684 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (discussing estoppel to raise
statute of limitations).
Is? Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320 U.S. 356, 356-67 (1943) (express
agreement made before period ends cannot waive statute of limitations built into cause of
action under Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. § 16(3)(a) (1970)); running of period
extinguishes right). The case is distinguishable because the limitation period was provided by
federal statute and the remedy in question was express rather than implied.
188 Weaver v. United Cal. Bank, 350 F. Supp. 1373, 1374-76 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
IS9 Conlon v. University Computing Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 93,796, at 93,442-43 (D.D.C. 1973); Smith v. Guaranty Serv. Corp., 51 F.R.D. 289,
295-96 (N.D. Cal. 1970); cf. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. Burchfield, 366 F.
Supp. 1364, 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (margin rules; counterclaim).
190 430 F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970).
191 Id. at 1208; accord, Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 570 (9th Cir.
1964) ("must show that the delay of the other party has resulted in a disadvantage to him");
Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 244 F.2d 902, 904 (3d Cir. 1957) (delay
plus prejudice), affg 143 F. Supp. 323, 328 (D. Del. 1956) (need more than mere lapse of time;
inexcusable delay plus resulting prejudice, as viewed by court); Goodman v. Poland, 395 F.
Supp. 660, 677-78 (D. Md. 1975) (unreasonable or inexcusable delay plus prejudice); Gordon
v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (lack of diligence and resulting prejudice);
Popkin v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FEr. SEC. L. REP. 94,091, at
94,371 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (lack of diligence and prejudice); Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 51
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Laches developed in common-law equity courts, partly because
the statute of limitations19 2 did not bar equitable claims. 193 With
both legal and equitable aspects,' 94 a 1 Ob-5 suit is barred either by
laches,' 95 by the statutes of limitations, or by both defenses. How-
ever, laches is applicable solely in 10b-5 cases requesting equitable
relief.' 96 Laches may therefore preclude a plaintiff from obtaining
F.R.D. 167, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (inexcusable delay and prejudice therefrom); Baumel v.
Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 143-44 (D. Md. 1968), modified, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970) (delay plus prejudice); Note, supra note 8, at 1477 n.7 ("an
unreasonable delay in asserting a right, to the disadvantage of the defendant").
192 The topic of the statute of limitations is treated in Part I supra.
' D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.3, at 43 (1973); Note, supra note 8, at 1488.
4 See A. JACOBS § 14 nn.21-27 and accompanying text.
'95 Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1306 n.27 (2d Cir. 1973); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1970), modifying 283 F. Supp. 417,
428-29 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 740, 74041 n.15 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 214 (9th Cir.
1962); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 244 F.2d 902, 904 (3d Cir. 1957),
aff'g 143 F. Supp. 323, 327-28 (D. Del. 1956); Chelsea Associates v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp.
929, 943 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Schilleci v. Guaranty Say. Life Ins. Co., 367 F. Supp. 903, 904
(N.D. Ala. 1973); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Ply-Gem Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,026, at 94,128 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd in part, remanded in part on other grounds, 503 F.2d 1362 (2d Cir. 1974); Powers v.
Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v.
Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 562 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Shapiro v. Schwamm, 279
F. Supp. 798, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Pitofsky v. Brucker, 291 F. Supp. 321, 322 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 775-76 (D. Colo. 1964);
Contra, Norte & Co. v. Krock, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,295, at
97,410 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
196 Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993,996 (7th Cir. 1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Conlon v. University Computing Co.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,796, at 93,443 (D.D.C. 1973); Saylor
v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor& Paine, 288
F. Supp. 836, 845 (E.D. Va. 1968); Shapiro v. Schwamm, 279 F. Supp. 798, 802 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 326 (D. Del.
1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957); Statutes Of Limitations, supra note 19, at 1159-60; cf.
Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370, 372-73 (9th Cir. 1961) (1933 Act
§ 12(1)); Hellerstein v. Mather, 360 F. Supp. 473,475 (D. Colo. 1973). See also Lowenfels, Rule
lOb-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative Action, 18 VAND. L. REv. 893, 909 n.78 (1965); Note,
Purchaser's Duty to Disclose Under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X-lOB-5, 40 MINN. L.
REv. 62, 75 (1955); Comment, Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X-JOB-5: Guided Missile
or Flying Saucer?, 32 TExAS L. REv. 197, 204 n.31 (1953); and Note, The Prospects for Rule
X-JOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1132 (1950) (all
indicate that only laches-and not statute of limitations-applies if solely equitable relief
requested).
A split of authority has developed as to the applicability of laches when rescission is sought
under § 29(b) of the 1934 Act. The better-reasoned cases permit the defense. Guarantee Ins.
Agency. Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 562 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Some cases
would not apply laches if the complaint seeks equitable relief as an alternative to legal
remedies. Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718,
742 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). Other sub silentio do not concur. See
notes 197-200 and accompanying text infra.
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an equitable remedy such as rescission, 197 although he might still
recover under the legal remedy of damages. 98 As a corollary, only
those defendants capable of supplying equitable relief can success-
fully assert laches.199 Suppose the plaintiff seeks rescission and dam-
ages in a multi-defendant suit arising from the sale of a private
company. If only the defendant who traded with the plaintiff can
satisfy the judgment ordering rescission, 20 0 he alone can invoke
laches to defeat the complaint's rescissional claims. One rationale for
the application of laches is that the Rule is designed to protect
innocent claimants, not those who lose their innocence by acting
with less than due diligence.2 0 Laches is not a defense in criminal
actions202 or in suits instituted by the SEC, even when the Commis-
sion seeks equitable ancillary relief.20 3
Laches differs from other lOb-5 defenses.20 4 Waiver con-
templates "the voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a knowri
right. ' 20 5 Ratification is similar to waiver,20 6 in that it requires volun-
tary or intentional actions. Laches is distinguishable from both
waiver and ratification because rights can be lost unintentionally. In
pari delicto precludes one of equal fault from obtaining any recov-
ery.207 Laches is narrower in that it precludes only equitable relief,
197 The classic legal remedy is damages. Equitable remedies include appointing a re-
ceiver; rescinding a trade, a merger, a stockholders vote, or another transaction; and enjoin-
ing the use of fraudulently solicited proxies, the holding of a stockholders meeting, the
completion of another act, or another violation of lOb-5.
198 Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1306 n.27 (2d Cir. 1973) (dictum);
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912,916 n.12 (4th Cir. 1973); Baumel v. Rosen, 412
F.2d 571, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1969) (granting damage recovery). See also D. DOBBS, supra note
193, § 2.4, at 45 (laches may constitute defense to all rights, or may preclude equitable relief
while permitting legal remedies).
1'9 Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 170 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart,
506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974).
200 As to the validity of this condition, see Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir.
1974).
'01 Chelsea Associates v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929, 943 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Gordon v.
Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973): Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp.
429, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1291 (D. Mass. 1972);
Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 562 (N.D. Ill.
1972); cf. note 248 (waiver) and accompanying text infra.
202 This is not to say that a delay in bringing a case to trial is permissible under principles
of criminal law.
203 Cf note 22 and accompanying text supra.
204 For a comparison of laches with estoppel and statutes of limitation, see text accom-
panying note 297 infra (estoppel) and notes 194-98 and accompanying text supra (statute of
limitations).
205 See part III A infra.
206 See notes 323-24 and accompanying text infra.
207 See part IV A infra.
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but is broader in that a defendant can establish the defense even
though the plaintiff was not as guilty. A defendant can use unclean
hands as an affirmative defense if the plaintiff engaged in unlawful
or inequitable conduct arising out of the matter in controversy. ° s
Laches has a lower threshold since it can bar a plaintiff who merely
delays; he need not participate in the scheme.
Laches is discretionary with the trial judge.2 0 9 Set by federal
law, 2 10 its two elements each raise questions of fact l.2 1  The first
element, lack of diligence, can be shown even if the applicable
statute of limitations has not run. 12 It is measured by the period
between the time the plaintiff "discovered" the fraud and the time
he sued, except in rescission actions. There the period is between
such "discovery" and the earlier of the time the plaintiff disclaimed
the sale and the time he tendered to the defendant the security or
payment for the security. 1 The federal tolling doctrine governs the
time a plaintiff is deemed to "discover" the fraud.214 In other words,
208 See part IV B infra.
209 Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 244 F.2d 902, 904 (3d Cir.
1957).
210 See note 191 and accompanying text supra.
211 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912, 918 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 916 (1974); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 62 F.R.D. 413,420 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Alco
Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 27 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp.
1282, 1291 & n.18 (D. Mass. 1972); Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 51 F.R.D. 167, 173 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Shapiro v. Schwamm, 279 F. Supp. 798, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Continental Tel. Corp. v.
Lycoming Tel. Corp., [ 1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,193, at 96,913
(E.D. Pa. 1968). As to the fact questions inherent in the federal tolling doctrine, see notes
153-56 and accompanying text supra.
212 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912, 917 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 916 (1974); Schilleci v. Guaranty Say. Life Ins. Co., 367 F. Supp. 903, 904 (N.D. Ala.
1973).
213 Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 375 (10th Cir. 1973) (no undue delay between
learning of fraud and tendering back shares received in merger); Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Hutton, 488 F.2d 912, 917-18 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974) (must advise of
intent to rescind within reasonable time of discovery); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478
F.2d 1281, 1306 n.27 (2d Cir. 1973) ("must act within a reasonable time after discovery of the
fraud"); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1969) (must give advice of intent to
rescind within reasonable time after discovery of grounds for rescission); Goodman v. Poland,
395 F. Supp. 660, 674 (D. Md. 1975) (must promptly assert once on notice); Hickman v.
Groesbeck, 389 F. Supp. 769, 780 (D. Utah 1974) (must request rescission as soon as discover
fraud); Chelsea Associates v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929, 943 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (must move
"promptly"); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Adelman v. CGS
Scientific Corp., 332 F. Supp. 137, 146 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (must promptly convey intent to
rescind to other party); see Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 424 (6th Cir. 1974)
(leaves open question if delay between learning of fraud and starting suit too long). Any delay
between the "discovery" and plaintiffs sale of the security he was fraudulently induced to
buy raises a question of the duty to mitigate damages, but does not bear on laches. The two
concepts are closely related and are sometimes confused or intermingled. Marth v. Industrial
Incomes Inc. of N. America, 290 F. Supp. 755, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
214 Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir. 1970); Tobacco & Allied
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this doctrine determines both when the statutory period of limita-
tions commences and the beginning of the plaintiff's delay under
laches. Both periods start either when the plaintiff has actual knowl-
edge of the fraud or when he should have discovered the fraud with
due diligence after receiving notice of facts arousing his suspi-
cions.2 15 Those events that suspend the statute of limitations2 16 have
a similar application to laches.21 7
Prejudice to the party raising the defense is the second element
of laches. Rule lOb-5 cases have not fully explored either the acts
that constitute prejudice or the requisite degree of prejudice. Com-
mon law and blue sky authorities treating prejudice are not control-
ling, for the policies underlying lOb-5 and its remedial nature 1 8
suggest that laches is a narrower defense in a lOb-5 context.21 9
Prejudice under the Rule could arise if the defendant either acted or
forebore from acting after the plaintiff "discovered" the fraud, 220 if
third parties' rights arose after "discovery" of the 1Ob-5 violation, 221
if principal witnesses died or their memories dimmed,222 or if stock
prices moved subsequent to the plaintiff's "discovery. '223 The neces-
sary degree of prejudice should vary with the facts involved and the
relief sought. A more stringent remedy (such as rescission) should
be barred by a smaller degree of prejudice than less radical relief.
Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 244 F.2d 902, 903-04 (3d Cir. 1957), affg 143 F. Supp.
323, 329-30 (D. Del. 1956); Schilleci v. Guaranty Say. Life Ins. Co., 367 F. Supp. 903, 904
(N.D. Ala. 1973); Kramer v. Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83, 87 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Collins v.
Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1291 & n.18 (D. Mass. 1972); Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D.
553,559 (D. Md. 1971); Statutes Of Limitations, supra note 19, at 1160;see Baumel v. Rosen, 412
F.2d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1969) (using same parameters as federal tolling).
21" See part I B supra.
216 See part I C supra.
2'7 For example, delay in bringing suit while a class action is pending is excused under a
laches defense. Hellerstein v. Mather, 360 F. Supp. 473, 475 (D. Colo. 1973).
218 See A. JACOBS §§ 6, 7 n.8 and accompanying text.
219 Cf note 238 (waiver), notes 300-05 (estoppel), notes 342-43 (in pari delicto), notes
366-71 (unclean hands), and accompanying text infra.
221 See Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 678 (D. Md. 1975) (must establish that
defendants "changed their position in a way that would not have occurred if the plaintiff [s]
had not delayed"), quoting Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, Local 317 v. Lorillard Corp., 448
F.2d 949, 958-59 (4th Cir. 1971).
221 When a plaintiff charges that the merger of two public companies was approved
pursuant to a misleading proxy statement, the third parties include persons who purchase
stock of the surviving corporation after the merger.
222 Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 244 F.2d 902, 904 (3d Cir.
1957).
223 Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1969) (delay fatal, particularly when
speculative property in question); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1962); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156,
171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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To secure rescission or rescissional damages, a plaintiff must act
promptly once he receives notice of the fraud.22 4 Although prompt
action is required even if the defendant cannot show prejudice,
prejudice is an element in determining how quickly the plaintiff
must act.2 - The same principles regarding unreasonable delay gov-
ern both laches and rescission. 2 6
III
WAIVER, ESTOPPEL, AND RATIFICATION
The defenses of waiver, estoppel, and ratification are recog-
nized by the common law. Such a recognition, however, does not
compel their availability to 1 Ob-5 defendants.
A. Waiver
The Ninth Circuit defines waiver as
"the voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a known right. It
emphasizes the mental attitude of the actor." Since waiver is a
voluntary act, there must be knowledge of the right in question
before the act of relinquishment can occur.227
224 Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1268 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974) (reasonable dispatch); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d
912,916 n.12, 917 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974),modifying 343 F. Supp. 245,
251, 253 (D. Md. 1972), and affg 326 F. Supp. 250, 261 (D. Md. 1971); Gersde v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1306 n.27 (2d Cir. 1973) ("must act within a reasonable time
after discovery of the fraud"); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1969) (must
advise of intent to rescind within reasonable time after discovering grounds for rescission);
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 740-41 n.15 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968)
(must "immediately elect to affirm or deny the contract"); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1962) (must act
promptly after discovery of fraud); Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 674 (D. Md. 1975)
(rescission "must be promptly asserted once a party is put on sufficient notice of the grounds
therefor"); Ehrler v. Kellwood Co., 391 F. Supp. 927, 930 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (nine-month delay
precludes rescission); Hickman v. Groesbeck, 389 F. Supp. 769, 780 (D. Utah 1974) (must
request rescission as soon as fraud discovered; Chelsea Associates v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp.
929, 943 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (must move "promptly"); Adelman v. CGS Scientific Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 137, 146 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (must act promptly to convey intent to rescind).
If a plaintiff loses his right to rescind under lOb-5, he also loses his right to rescind under
section 29(b) of the 1934 Act. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d at
1267-68 n.9.
22 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 343 F. Supp. 245, 259 n.19 (D. Md. 1972), modified,
488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
226 E.g., Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 677-78 (D. Md. 1975) (finding of no
unreasonable delay for rescission also controls for laches). Therefore rescission cases are
freely cited in this discussion of laches.
2127 Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1964), citing Matsuo
Yoshida v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 240 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1957); accord, Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Ross, 509 F.2d 930, 933 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974) (necessarily intentional); Fey v.
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Judicial hostility to waiver of 10b-5 rights requires courts to investi-
gate scrupulously whether the relinquishment was intentional or
voluntary. 28 Authorities disagree on what degree of knowledge a
plaintiff must have of rights before he can waive them. Some courts
correctly hold that only actual knowledge of the right will suffice. 29
The opposing view requires either actual knowledge or knowledge a
plaintiff would obtain after a reasonable investigation. 230 If courts
impose on plaintiffs a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation, the
scope of such knowledge should rest on a subjective standard. Thus
a plaintiff may have constructive knowledge of a right under one set
of facts, while such knowledge might not be imputed to another
plaintiff under the same facts, or to the same plaintiff under differ-
ent facts. Courts adopting the "reasonable-investigation" approach
should use the following factors, among others, to determine the
extent of a plaintiffs diligence: the plaintiffs general business ex-
perience or sophistication; his familiarity with the corporation's af-
fairs; his access to information; his opportunity to detect the fraud;
whether he was investing a large amount of money; 23 1 whether he
Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974) (knowledge and intent to relinquish);
Murtagh v. University Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810, 816 (5th Cir. 1974); Hecht v. Harris
Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208(9th Cir. 1970); Mittendorfv.J.R. Williston & Beane Inc.,
372 F. Supp. 821, 834-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly made by
well counseled parties well aware of their litigation options"); Childs v. RIG Group, Inc., 331
F. Supp. 1078, 1083 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 447 F.2d 1407 (5th Cir. 1971)
(intentional and right actually known); Cohen v. Tenney Corp., 318 F. Supp. 280, 284
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (intentional and voluntary); Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 51 F.R.D. 167, 171
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (no waiver if did not know facts); Note, supra note 8, at 1447 n.7; cf. Pearlstein
v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1143 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971)
,(margin rules; waiver must be knowing); Zapach v. Elkins, Morris, Stroud & Co., 375 F. Supp.
669, 671-72 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (margin rules; release invalid if unintentional or involuntary);
Junker v. Midterra Associates, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (1933 Act § 12,
"intentional relinquishment of a known right after learning of the violation"). One Second
Circuit case can be construed as holding that a waiver is not intentional if it results from
economic pressure on the plaintiff caused by the defendant's breach. Pearlstein v. Scudder &
German, supra at 1142-43 (margin rules).
228 Murtagh v. University Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810, 816 (5th Cir. 1974); Korn v.
Franchard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Cohen v. Tenney Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); cf. 92 C.J.S. Waiver 1068 (1955) (waiver "in derogation of a
statutory right is not favored").
229 Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 375 (10th Cir. 1973) (full knowledge); Royal Air
Props., Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1964); Childs v. RIC Group, Inc., 331 F.
Supp. 1078, 1083 (N.D. Ga. 1970), affd per curiam, 447 F.2d 1407 (5th Cir. 1971) ("actually
known").
230 Korn v. Franchard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Mittendorf v.
J.R. Williston & Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Collins v. Rukin, 342 F.
Supp. 1282, 1291 & n.18 (D. Mass. 1972) (became aware or should have become aware).
231 The proper measurement should relate to the percentage of the plaintiffs net worth
involved, rather than the number of dollars invested.
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put his trust in the defendant's advice; and whether the defendant
was a fiduciary or occupied a position of trust and confidence. 3
The legislative and administrative histories of 1Ob-5 do not
indicate when defendants can assert a waiver defense. 233 However,
section 29(a) of the Exchange Act is germane:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to
waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule
or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required
thereby shall be void.23
4
Rule lOb-5's remedial nature, 35 and its underlying policies of pro-
tecting investors and fostering their trust,2 36 suggest that waiver
should not be a defense. 37 These policies also indicate that if waiver
is ever a lOb-5 defense, its availability should be limited to the
narrowest common-law construction.
23 8
The recognition of waiver as a defense to a lOb-5 suit is a
question of federal law.2 39 The Supreme Court examined this issue
in two opinions involving the question of 1Ob-5's arbitrability. Arbi-
trability is closely related to the waiver defense, because both rest in
part on section 29(a). In Wilko v. Swan, 40 the Court held that section
14 of the 1933 Act2 4 1 precludes a plaintiff from agreeing to arbitrate
232 See A. JACOBS § 64.01[b][ii] nn.24-42 and accompanying text (subjective reliance).
233 Note, supra note 8, at 1477-78. See generally A. JACOBS §§ 5.01-.02 (legislative and
administrative histories of Rule). The absence of authority is not surprising, since 1Ob-5 is an
implied remedy.
234 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970). Courts have
correctly assumed that § 29(a)'s wording "any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder" applies to express remedies and to implied remedies like IOb-5. Note,
Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act: A "'Legislative Chaperon"for Rule lOb-5, 63 Nw. U.L.
REv. 499, 502 (1968).
13' See A. JACOBS § 7 nn.8-9 and accompanying text.
23' See id. §§ 6.06-.08.
137 These policies alone justify the rejection of the waiver defense. Note, supra note 234,
at 500 n.9 (suggesting that waiver is a contract notion and should be limited to face-to-face
transactions).
238 Bell, supra note 11, at 5.
239 Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 273 F. Supp. 651, 653 (D. Colo. 1967)
(determine validity of release under federal law). But see Korn v. Franchard Corp., 388 F.
Supp. 1326, 1332 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (state law construing scope of release).
240 346 U.S. 427, 430, 434-35 (1953).
241 Section 14 of the 1933 Act is virtually identical to § 29(a) of the 1934 Act. Coenen v.
R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972)
("virtually identical"); Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 304 1. Supp. 325, 331
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 422 F.2d 1100 (2d Cir. 1970) ("virtually the same"); see
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 514 n.7 (1974) ("not identical," but "the variations
in their wording seem irrelevant to the [arbitration] issue presented"). Section 14 of the
Securities Act provides:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regula-
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future Securities Act claims, since section 14 prohibits waivers of
stipulations, and an agreement to arbitrate is a "stipulation. '242
Twenty-one years later, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,243 the Court
decided that the 1934 Act does not prohibit two sophisticated parties
engaged in an international transaction from agreeing to arbitrate
future controversies before the International Chamber of Com-
merce in Paris. This case is correctly construed to create a narrow
exception only for international transactions.244 The Supreme
Court decisions can be synthesized: an agreement to arbitrate future
claims under the 1933 or 1934 Acts is a stipulation which waives
compliance with the Acts and is therefore voidable, except in transac-
tions where principles of international law override the nonwaiver
provisions of the two Acts.
Lower courts have not permitted a plaintiff to waive a lOb-5
right before the right matures or before he knows it exists. 45 How-
ever, a plaintiff may waive a matured 10b-5 right if he knows the
facts. 246 A matured right is one that arose in the past---i.e., the
tions of the Commission shall be void.
Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970). The differences between that section and
§ 29(a) of the 1934 Act are twofold. First, the words "acquiring any security" are found only in
the 1933 Act provision. This is appropriate because that Act protects defrauded purchasers in
securities distributions, whereas the 1934 Act has a broader coverage. Second, the words
"thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby" are contained in the 1934 Act,
while the earlier enactment had the word "Commission" in their place. The difference derives
from two sources-the Commission is not the only agency which promulgates rules under the
Exchange Act, and rules of national securities exchanges were contemplated to supplement
the provisions of the 1934 Act.
242 346 U.S. at 430-35.
243 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
244 Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
245 Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 375 (10th Cir. 1973); Korn v. Franchard Corp., 388 F.
Supp. 1326, 1329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Mittendorfv.J.R. Williston & Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp.
821, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Levin v. Marder, 343 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Special
Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F. Supp. 1185,1187 (D. Minn. 1971); Eyman v. Marsha Dev.
Corp., 301 F. Supp. 931, 934 (E.D. Mo. 1969). This proposition is true even if the waiver is
voluntary or intentional. Special Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F. Supp. 1185, 1187 (D.
Minn. 1972).
246 Murtagh v. University Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810, 816 (5th Cir. 1974); Korn v.
Franchard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1326, 1329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Mittendorf v.J.R. Williston &
Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821,834 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Eyman v. Marsha Dev. Corp., 301 F. Supp.
931, 934 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Note, supra note 234, at 517; see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan
&Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1267-68 n.9 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974) (waiver
applies to § 10(b) cases); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974) (available
on proper showing); Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962); Powers
v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429,433 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Marth v. Industrial Incomes
Inc. of N. America, 290 F. Supp. 755, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
283 F. Supp. 417, 428 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202.(gth Cir. 1970); Moran v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 279 F. Supp. 573, 578 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (motion to dismiss),
affd, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247
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plaintiff waived the right after the lOb-5 breach occurred. 247 One
court justified waivers of matured claims by opining that
[t]he purpose of the Securities Exchange Act is to protect the
innocent investor, not one who loses his innocence and then waits
to see how his investment turns out before he decides to invoke
the provisions of the 'Act.2
48
Despite the general rule that matured claims can be waived, courts
will not enforce a waiver which continues a 10b-5 violation. 249 Thus
a voluntary settlement of a case is unenforceable if the terms of the
settlement require (or perhaps permit) the continuation of the ac-
tionable manipulation attacked in the complaint.
A wide variety of future, or unmatured, claims cannot be
waived. The most obvious is a plaintiffs agreement, in a contract for
the purchase or sale of a security, to waive his rights under the Rule
or to refrain from suing for any related lOb-5 breach. 250 Clearly, a
plaintiff cannot waive rights about which he is ignorant by deliver-
ing a general or a specific release when he contracts to buy or sell a
security, when the transaction is consummated, or at any time
thereafter. 251 More subtle types of waivers are also barred. Thus a
F. Supp. 373, 378 (S.D. Tex. 1965); cf. Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d
370, 373-74 (9th Cir. 1961) (1933 Act § 12(1)); Zapach v. Elkins, Morris, Stroud & Co., 375 F.
Supp. 669, 672 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (margin rules); Note, supra note 8, at 1487 (1933 Act and
arbitration). See also Rosen v. Dick, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,786, at 96,604 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (indicating all releases void); Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis &
Co., 195 F.2d 838, 844 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952) (§ 14 disregards principles of
waiver). Waiver is not available under § 16(b) of the 1934 Act. As to a similar impact in another
area of 10b-5 jurisprudence, see note 277 infra (estoppel).
2417 See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1326, 1329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Junker v.
Midterra Associates, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
248 Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962); accord, Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1970), modifying 283 F. Supp. 417, 428
(N.D. Cal. 1968); Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 373,377 (S.D. Tex. 1965);
see Chelsea Associates v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929, 943 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (rescission
requested); Ferguson v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 369 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1974)
(principally estoppel case).
249 Murtagh v. University Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810, 816 (5th Cir. 1974); Korn v.
Franchard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1326, 1329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); cf. Pearlstein v. Scudder &
German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971) (margin
rules); Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [ 1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,760, at 96,501 (S.D. Cal. 1974); Zapach v. Elkins, Morris, Stroud & Co., 375 F. Supp. 669,
672 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (margin rules). See also Jennings v. Boenning & Co., 352 F. Supp. 1000,
1006 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 482 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1973) (question if federal
court will enjoin state action on note where note was obtained as part of stipulation waiving
compliance with margin requirements).
250 Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 375 (10th Cir. 1973); Levin v. Marder, 343 F. Supp.
1050, 1056 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Eyman v. Marsha Dev. Corp., 301 F. Supp. 931, 934 (E.D. Mo.
1969).
2"1 Thomas v. Duraline Co., 386 F. Supp. 698, 730 n.13 (D.N.J. 1974).
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plaintiff does not waive his rights if a contract for the purchase or
sale of a security provides that: he obtained all relevant informa-
tion;2 52 the plaintiff is fully familiar with the business, is not relying
on the defendants' duty to disclose, and has made all necessary
investigations; 253 all representations are contained in the con-
tract;2 54 the defendant makes no representation; 255 or no represen-
tation survives the closing.256 Courts will admit parol evidence to
refute contractual waivers.2 57 In addition, a claimant cannot waive
any remedy that arises out of an unmatured claim. For example, it is
unenforceable to limit contractually the plaintiffs right to offset
against the note that the defendant received from the plaintiff.258 A
procedural obstacle-such as a requirement for posting bond or a
short statute of limitations contained in a contract-cannot be im-
posed on rights arising from unmatured claims.2 59 Asking for, but
not insisting on, a contractual representation during negotiations
does not establish a waiver.2 60
Nevertheless, courts have found a waiver when: the plaintiff
executed a stipulation settling a suit or a claim; 261 a release was given
after litigation commenced;2 6 2 or a customer of a broker-dealer
2 Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205, 1208 n.8 (5th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff represented that he
received all information necessary to make decision); Note, supra note 234, at 505-06.
2'3 Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 267-68 (1st Cir. 1966); Eisenberg v. North Am.
Leisure Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,434, at 95,490
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
254 Allen Organ Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117, 1126-27 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Note, supra note 234, at 507-08.
255 Adelman v. CGS Scientific Corp., 332 F. Supp. 137, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Nor is it
sufficient to state in a contract that the plaintiff will be supplied with whatever information he
desires. See A. JAcoBs, § 64.04 n.4 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 234, at
506-07 (type of impermissible waiver).
256 Lockwood, supra note 118, at 373-74.
257 See generally Allen Organ Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117,
1126-27 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (parol evidence admissible to prove that contractual provision,
introduced by fraud, does not reflect true intentions of parties); Levin v. Marder, 343 F. Supp.
1050, 1056 (W.D. Pa. 1972). Levin observed that this is a general contract law concept and is
therefore not peculiar to securities law.
256 Special Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F. Supp. 1185, 1186-87 (D. Minn. 1971).
259 Note, supra note 234, at 515-16.
2'60 Childs v. RIC Group, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1078, 1083 (N.D. Ga. 1970),affdperuriam,
447 F.2d 1407 (5th Cir. 1971).
261 Murtagh v. University Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810, 816 (5th Cir. 1974); Simon v.
Garrett, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,732, at 96,433 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); see Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1013 (1971) (settlement apparently valid except that settlement continued violation
of margin rules). As to the effect of a state court settlement on 1 Ob-5 claims not there asserted,
see note 375 and accompanying text infra.
262 Korn v. Franchard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1326, 1328-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Mittendorfv.
J.R. Williston & Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 834-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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received confirmations after churning took place.263 Moreover, a
plaintiff who, with full knowledge of the facts, obtains a judgment
affirming a contract, waives his right to sue for damages in a later
action.264
Cases assessing waiver have limited precedential value, 6 5 since
the presence of waiver is a question of fact.26 6 A plaintiff can nullify
his waiver if it was obtained by fraud.267 A waiver can be binding
even though it is given for no consideration.268 A waiver by some
members of a class binds only those members and not other class
members. 2 69
A plaintiff's actions may bar him from obtaining a form of
equitable relief, such as rescission or an injunction.270 The defense
of waiver is different. It precludes all types of recoveries. The ability
to prohibit equitable relief is less drastic, since a plaintiff who is
prevented from obtaining rescission (for example) may be able to
recover damages.
Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act and its policy considera-
tions2 7' do not limit waivers of unmatured common-law claims that
are pendent to a 1Ob-5 cause of action.272 Thus, a contractual waiver
operates against unmatured common-law claims (absent some other
public policy precluding the waiver), although it has no force re-
garding the lOb-5 cause of action. 3
263 Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 428-29 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th
Cir. 1970) (seven years); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F.
Supp. 373, 377 (S.D. Tex. 1965); cf. note 307 and accompanying text infra (estoppel). But see
Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049-51 (7th Cir. 1974) (not waiver as matter of law;
waiver has no independent significance here, because broker's control of account constitutes
element of churning). Regarding churning, see A. JACOBS § 212.01.
264 Eyman v. Marsha Dev. Corp., 301 F. Supp. 931, 933-35 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
265 The reader should not confuse the assertion in the text with the question of when
waiver is available. Unmatured rights can never be waived, and therefore waiver is then a
question of law. But whether the plaintiff waived a matured right is a question of fact.
266 Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049-51 (7th Cir. 1974); American Electronic
Laboratories, Inc. v. Dopp, 352 F. Supp. 835, 839 (D. Del. 1972); Cohen v. Tenney Corp., 318
F. Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
267 Korn v. Franchard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rosen v. Dick,
(1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP'. 94,786, at 96,604 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Mittendorfv.J.R. Williston & Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Weinstein v.
Zimet, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,320, at 94,267-68 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); cf. 92 C.J.S. Waiver 1054-55 (1955). This is a corollary to the principle that waivers must
be voluntary or intentional. See note 227 and accompanying text supra.
26 Cf Note, supra note 8, at 1487.
269 Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 51 F.R.D. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
270 See part II supra (laches).
271 See notes 234-38 and accompanying text supra.
272 See Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176, 1178, 1181 (2d Cir. 1974) (arbitration
case); Pagwan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (arbitration case).
273 If a waiver clause is drafted so broadly that it covers both 1 Ob-5 and pendent claims,
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Waiver has been confused with the in pari delicto and unclean
hands defenses. 274 For example, a party's guilt is sometimes said to
constitute a waiver.275 Waiver must also be distinguished from dis-
closure and curing. A defendant can cure a prior misstatement or
omission by making full disclosure before the plaintiff is committed
to act.27 6 The defendant thus avoids breaching 1 Ob-5. If the plaintiff
waives his rights after the defendant has violated 1Ob-5, the defen-
dant's affirmative defense of waiver precludes the plaintiff from
recovering.
B. Estoppel
Estoppel is a recognized defense to a 10b-5 cause of action.277
Although the 1Ob-5 cases have not explored the parameters of
estoppel in depth, common-law authorities and 10b-5 itself yield
some conclusions.
The Ninth Circuit has recognized four necessary elements of an
estoppel defense.
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must
and if the clause is against public policy as to the lOb-5 portion, must the whole provision fall?
Apparently no reported case has considered this question.
274 See part IV, A & B infra.
7I E.g., Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1964); Eyman v.
Marsha Dev. Corp., 301 F. Supp. 931, 934 (E.D. Mo. 1969), citing Can-Am Petroleum Co.,
supra ("one party's own culpability does not waive or bar his action where the other party is
more culpable").
276 See A. JAcoBs § 64.04.
277 E.g., Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1970), modifying 283 F. Supp. 417,428 (N.D.
Cal. 1968); Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1964); Royal Air
Props., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962); Ferguson v. Francis I. duPont & Co.,
369 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1974); American Electronic Laboratories, Inc. v. Dopp,
352 F. Supp. 835, 839 (D. Del. 1972); Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 433
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Marth v. Industrial Incomes Inc. of N. America, 290 F. Supp. 755, 757
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 279 F. Supp. 573, 578 (W.D. Pa.
1966) (motion to dismiss), affid, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 373, 378 (S.D. Tex. 1965); cf. Naftalin & Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 469 F.2d 1166, 1182 (8th Cir. 1972) (margin rules;
person who instigated and perpetrated illegal schemes cannot prevail); Straley v. Universal
Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370, 373-74 (9th Cir. 1961) (1933 Act § 12(1)). But cf.
Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838, 843-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856
(1952) (Securities Act § 14 bars defense of estoppel). The minority view of Kaiser-Frazer is
limited to early cases. Note, supra note 234, at 503 n.20.
Estoppel is available both against aiders and abettors, and against primarily liable actors.
See Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1118 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 96
S. Ct. 1375 (1976). But it is not recognized as a defense to a claim under § 16(b) of the 1934
Act. See A. JACOBS § 3.02[g] n.29 and accompanying text. Those cases are not apt in a lOb-5
context, however, since different policies underlie lob-5 and § 16(b). To the same effect, see id.
at §§ 3.01[c] n.16 (1933 Act § 12(2)) and 3.02[b] n.33 (margin rules), and accompanying text.
The Rule's sparce legislative and administrative history sheds no light on the availability of
estoppel as a defense. Note, supra note 8, at 1477-78. See generally A. JACOBS §§ 5.01-.02.
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intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the
party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended;
(3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must
rely on the former's conduct to his injury.2 78
Examining these four elements is the best way to explore the scope
of estoppel.
The first element requires the plaintiff to "know the facts. '27 9
The word "know" clearly includes actual knowledge. Many
courts also impose on plaintiffs a due diligence obligation to
ascertain the facts. 280 Plaintiffs are therefore estopped if they knew
or should have known the facts.2 8 1 A plaintiff must know those
"facts" that comprise the data on which the defendant relies to his
injury. 282 For instance, a plaintiff must know that his statement is
wrong if he is to be estopped from denying its truth. The facts a
plaintiff must know might consist of an inaction, as when a cus-
tomer, after receiving without objection confirmation slips from his
broker, charges that his account was churned. The customer knew
the "fact" that he objected to the churning. A plaintiff adequately
knows the facts if he has knowledge when he makes a statement,
takes an action, or remains silent despite a duty to disclose. Estoppel
should also be available when the plaintiff acquires knowledge
thereafter but before the defendant is irrevocably bound to an
278 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970), quoting Hampton
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960). This is equitable estoppel (also
called estoppel in pais) under common law. The other two common law estoppels are estoppel
by record and estoppel by deed. 28 AM. JUR. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 1, at 600 (1966).
279 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970), quoting Hampton
v. Paramount Picture Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960).
280 Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1118 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976) ("whether plaintiffs knew or as reasonable persons should have
known"); Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1964); see Collins v.
Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1291 & n.18 (D. Mass. 1972); cf. Hampton v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960) (interpreting same estoppel test employed in IlOb-5
cases); 28 AM. JUR. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 27, at 627, § 35, at 640-41 (1966) (common law).
But see Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 375 (10th Cir. 1973) (full knowledge); Continental Tel.
Corp. v. Lycoming Tel. Corp., [ 1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 92,193,
at 96,913 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (must fully advise plaintiff).
The cases do not concentrate on whether the due diligence standard looks to the plain-
tiff's individual foibles and sophistication (a subjective standard) or on what a reasonable man
would learn (an objective standard). A subjective standard should be used.
281 Estoppel exists under common law even if the plaintiff believes his statement is true,
he was not negligent in obtaining facts, or he stated something other than what he intended.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 894, comment b at 503 (1939).
282 See Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104-05 (9th Cir. 1960),
quoted in Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970). See also
California State Bd. of Equalization v. Coast Radio Prods., 228 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1955)
(relied on by Hampton, supra). But see Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 571 (9th
Cir. 1964) ("diligence in discovering his rights").
1976] RULE 10b-5 DEFENSES
action that injures him, at least if the plaintiff has a continuing duty
to correct the misleading impression.2 83
The second element of estoppel in the* Ninth Circuit requires
that the plaintiff "intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must
so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is
so intended.12 4 The first prong of this element-that the-plaintiff
intend that his conduct be acted on-focuses on the plaintiff's sub-
jective intent. However, the outward appearance of the plaintiff's
actions measures his subjective intent unless he admits that he in-
tended the defendant to act on that conduct. The subjective prong
of this element therefore rarely has any practical weight. Courts
usually employ the objective second half-that the defendant has a
right to believe it is so intended. It applies if the defendant rea-
sonably believes that the plaintiff intended him to act on the plain-
tiff's conduct. This "conduct" could consist of oral or written
statements, 2 5 actions, 286 or silence when a duty to speak exists. 287
The third element of the Ninth Circuit's formulation is that the
defendant "must be ignorant of the true facts. 12 8 This wording
appears to require actual knowledge by the defendant. But the
better-reasoned authorities demand that defendants exercise due
diligence 28 9 to learn the true facts. A defendant who fails to meet
that requirement cannot use estoppel as a defense, unless the plain-
tiffs acts were more than negligent,29 ° or perhaps unless the defen-
283 See A. JACOBS §§ 88.04 (duty to disclose when not trading), 62 n.29 and 66.02(c) n.30
(duration of duty to disclose).
284 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970),quoting Hampton
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960).
285 Cf 28 AM. JUR. 2d Estoppel-and Waiver § 35, at 641 (1966) (common law); RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 894(2) (1939) (common law).
286 Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1964) ("neglect or
misleading action"); cf. 28 AM. JUR. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 35, at 641 (1966) (common law).
The act can be either express or implied. 28 AM.JuR. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 1, at 600 (1966).
287 Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, .333 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1964) ("neglect or
misleading action"); cf. Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir.
1960) (construing test for estoppel used in lOb-5 cases); 28 AM. JUR. 2d Estoppel and Waiver
§ 35, at 641 (1966); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 894(2) (1939) (common law). See A. JACOBS
§§ 66.02, 88.04 as to when a defendant has a duty to speak. That discussion bears little on
when a plaintiff is obligated not to remain silent. Virtually no I Ob-5 authority addresses this
question. Cf RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 894(2) (1939) ("could easily inform the other..-, and
makes no effort to do so").
"'s Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970),quoting Hampton
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960).
289 Cf 28 Am. JUR. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 35, at 641 (1966) (common law). This due
diligence requirement should be a subjective-rather than objective-test. Thus, the
touchstone is the particular defendant and not the "reasonable man." This is similar to
subjective reliance of a plaintiff. See A. JACOBS § 74.01[b][ii].
290 Cf RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 894, comment b at 503, illustration
no. 5, at 507 (1939).
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dant would not have learned the truth after a reasonable investiga-
tion.2 91 Although lOb-5 cases supply little guidance, the "true facts"
are those on which the defendant relies. This follows, in part, from
the first case to espouse the Ninth Circuit's definition of estoppel.292
That case, which did not involve the securities law, adopted the
definition in the context of a plaintiff's concealment or misstate-
ment. The "true facts" in that situation are readily discerned. How-
ever, "true facts" are not as easy to identify in some 10b-5 cases.
When a customer charges that his account was churned after receiv-
ing, without objection, the confirmation slip, the "true fact" is that
the customer-plaintiff objected to the volume of trading in his ac-
count. The broker-dealer is ignorant of this fact because the cus-
tomer never conveyed his dissatisfaction.
Under the last element of estoppel, the defendant "'must rely
on the [plaintiffs] conduct to [the defendant's] injury.' "293 Even
though the requisite reliance has not been definitively charted, an
appropriate analogy is to the kind of reliance by plaintiffs required
to prove a cause of action. 294 Nor has the form of injury been
explored in depth. Sufficient injury should exist if a defendant
changes position 295 or continues a course of conduct that he would
have stopped but for plaintiff's actions or inactions.2 96
In contrast to laches, which only precludes equitable rem-
edies, 297 estoppel bars all relief in a private right of action. The
defenses of estoppel and waiver are sometimes confused.2 9 8 The
291 See A. JACOBS §§ 63 n.5, 64.01[b][ii] n.72, 235.03 n.36 and accompanying text (same
point valid for defendant's due diligence under scienter, plaintiff's due diligence under
subjective reliance, and plaintiff's due diligence under federal tolling doctrine (see notes
120-78 and accompanying text)).
292 California State Bd. of Equalization v. Coast Radio Prods., 228 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir.
1955).
293 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970), quoting Hampton
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960).
294 See A. JACOBS § 64.01. See also 28 AM.JUR. 2dEstoppeland Waiver § 35, at 641 (1966)
(need good faith reliance); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 894, at 502 (1939) (reasonable reliance
needed); Note, supra note 8, at 1477 n.7, 1486 (reasonable reliance; "reasonable man in the
defendant's position"). This ties into-but is different from-the defendant's due diligence.
See note 289 and accompanying textsupra. As to differences between the concepts, compare A.
JACOBS § 64.01[b][ii] (plaintiff's subjective reliance and due diligence), with id. at § 64.01[b][iii]
(plaintiff's reasonable reliance).
"I Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974); cf. Hampton v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104-05 (9th Cir. 1960) (construing same test for estoppel as in
lOb-5); 28 AM. JUR. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 35, at 627 (1966) (common law).
"I Cf 28 AM. JUR. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 35, at 641 (1966) (common law; "action or
inaction").
297 See notes 196-98 and accompanying text supra.
298 Cf 31 C.J.S.Estoppel § 61, at 385 (1964) (common law). An example in a securities law
context isJunker v. Midterra Associates, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 310,313 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (referring to
actions as waiver when they really constitute estoppel).
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essence of waiver is a voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a
right; hence, the defense rests on the plaintiff's intention. On the
other hand, estoppel occurs when the defendant detrimentally relies
on the plaintiff's acts or silence. Because a defendant can base
estoppel on his reaction to the plaintiff's conduct, a plaintiff may be
bound regardless of his intent. Estoppel is not the same as disclosure
and curing. Before a breach occurs, a defendant can cure any prior
misinformation by makihig adequate disclosure to the plaintiff.299
Estoppel focuses on the plaintiff's conduct after his breach and the
defendant's detrimental reliance.
Because estoppel is a question of fact, 30 0 prior opinions have
limited precedential utility in defining what actions constitute an
estoppel. Few cases decide whether a set of acts estops a plaintiff in a
1 Ob-5 action. Authorities interpreting blue sky laws or the common
law are not controlling,30 1 since actions which estop a plaintiff in
those cases may be insufficient to estop him in a IOb-5 action.30 2 This
derives in part from the Rule's remedial nature 0 3 and its underlying
policy of protecting investors and fostering their trust.30 4 These
policy considerations have no force against pendent claims, how-
ever. A court may therefore find that a plaintiff's actions are
sufficiently serious to estop him from asserting his pendent claims
but not his 1Ob-5 cause of action. In contrast to private action,
estoppel will not operate against a suit by the Commission 30 5 or in a
criminal action.
Subject to the above qualifications, the estoppel defense has
succeeded when: the plaintiff-buyer refused both the defendant-
seller's demand for securities and his tender of the proper measure
of damages; 30 6 a broker's customer received confirmations for
twenty-two months during which he believed his account was
209 As to disclosure and curing, see A. JACOBS § 64.04.
300 American Electronic Laboratories, Inc. v. Dopp, 352 F. Supp. 835, 839 (D. Del. 1972);
Junker v. Midterra Associates, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Continental Tel.
Corp. v. Lycoming Tel. Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,193,
at 96,913 (E.D. Pa. 1968); see Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974)
(cannot decide estoppel as matter of law).
30' The variation in fact patterns is one reason blue sky and common law cases are not
uniform in determining whether the defendant should rely. Note, supra note 8, at 1486.
302 See Bell, supra note 11, at 5.
303 See A. JAcoBs § 7 n.8 and accompanying text.
04 See id. §§ 6.06, 6.08.
305 Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 715, 722 n.9 (8th Cir. 1974)
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); SEC v. Aldred Inv. Trust, 224 F. Supp. 626, 627 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
"I Cf Meyers v. C & M Petroleum Producers, Inc., 476 F.2d 427, 429-30 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 829 (1973) (1933 Act § 12(1)).
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churned; 30 7 for five to seven months a customer received confirma-
tions indicating that his broker did not execute his orders; 30 8 a
plaintiff brought a state court action to affirm a contract and then
sued under lOb-5 to disaffirm it;30 9 and a plaintiff assumed control of
the corporation after knowing it defrauded him.310 Estoppel does
not operate in a lOb-5 suit when plaintiff-customers, who were not
sent confirmations by the broker-dealer's accountant, failed to in-
form those accountants of a fraud.31' Nor is a plaintiff estopped
merely because he gave proxies, 312 accepted dividends, 31 3 attended
stockholders' meetings,3 1 4 or was the defendant's fiduciary.3 15 Simi-
larly, a defendant is not estopped from raising an affirmative defense
solely because he was the plaintiffs fiduciary. 3 6
C. Ratification
Ratification validates a prior act.317 Whether ratification has
occurred is a question of fact. 318 It arises as a 1Ob-5 defense in two
distinct factual settings. First, a corporation's stockholders or its
directors may ratify the mismanagement aspects of a 1 Ob-5 viola-
tion. 319 In the second type of ratification, a plaintiff voluntarily or
intentionally approves or confirms prior conduct with full knowl-
edge of the facts. 320 This defense has been recognized under lOb-5
307 Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 373-74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1002 (1973), rehearing denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); accord, Powers v. Francis I. DuPont &
Co., 344 F. Supp. 429,433 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417,
428-29 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (seven years); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 373, 377-78 (S.D. Tex. 1965) (11
months). But see Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1050 (7th Cir. 1974) (estoppel has no
independent significance in churning cases, since churning presupposes control of account by
defendant-broker). As to churning, see A. JACOBS § 212.01.
308 Ferguson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 369 F. Supp. 1099, 1100-12 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
309 Eyman v. Marsha Dev. Corp., 301 F. Supp. 931, 934 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
310 Note, supra note 8, at 1486.
311 Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1118 n.24 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
312 Note, supra note 8, at 1486.
313 Id. at 1486. See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Ross, 509 F.2d 930, 933 n.3 (2d Cir.
1975) (plaintiff does not waive right to rescind by paying dividends on stock issued to
defendants in fraudulent acquisition).
314 Note, supra note 8, at 1486.
315 See Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 329
(D. Del. 1956), affd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957) (defendant not estopped to assert affirmative
defense).
316 Id.
317 See American Elec. Labs., Inc. v. Dopp., 352 F. Supp. 835 (D. Del. 1972).
318 Id. at 839.
319 See A. JAcoBs § 121.03.
320 This principle was established at common law. 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 7, at 342
(1964); 28 AM.JUR. 2d Waiver and Estoppel § 31, at 635 n.6 (1966); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 10, at
587-88 (1963); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 61, at 385 (1964); 75 C.J.S. 608-09 (1952) (ratification).
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when a brokerage customer continued doing business after receiv-
ing confirmation slips that revealed prior violations3 21 and when a
plaintiff sued to affirm a contract in state court.3 22
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.3 23
Ratification approves a prior act, and hence gives the act validity.
The consequences of these two defenses are similar, since relin-
quishing a known right gives validity to the prior act, and approving
a prior act operates to relinquish a known right.324 Estoppel is quite
different. Its essence is in having induced another to act to his
prejudice; a plaintiff can be estopped even if he does not intend to
be.325 On the other hand, a plaintiff must intend to ratify an action.
IV
IN PARI DELICTO AND UNCLEAN HANDS
The next two defenses discussed-in pari delicto and unclean
hands-bar recovery for plaintiffs who are sufficiently involved in
the lOb-5 breach.
A. In Pari Delicto
In pari delicto literally means "of equal fault."32 6 Accepted as a
defense in some 10b-5 cases, 327 it has traditionally been a defense to
actions at law. 28 In pari delicto bars recovery of all relief in private
damage actions, but plays no role when the Commission sues32 9 or in
criminal actions.
321 Ferguson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 369 F. Supp. 1099, 1101 (N.D. Tex. 1974); see
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 373, 377-78 (S.D. Tex.
1965).
322 Eyman v. Marsha Dev. Corp., 301 F. Supp. 931, 934 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (using other
labels).
323 See part III A supra.
324 Cf. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 61, at 385 (1964) (common law).
325 See part III B supra.
326 Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Honvath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 137
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1106 (S.D. Tex. 1970); 38 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 337, 340 n.25 (1969).
327 James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1974); Clement A. Evans & Co. v.
McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 703-05 (5th Cir. 1969); Hogan v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp.
1043, 1047 (N.D. 111. 1971); Note, In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands as Defenses to Private Suit
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 30 MD. L. REv. 75, 85-88 (1970);see Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89,
92-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (availability in this case not free from doubt). Contra, Davis v. Avco
Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782, 792 (N.D. Ohio 1974); see 44 TULANE L. REv. 618, 624 (1970)
(inappropriate as lOb-5 defense).
328 But see 1 LoYoLA U.L.J. 146, 150 (1970) (in both law and equity historically). Unclean
hands may supply the desired defense in suits requesting equitable relief. See part IV B infra.
329 See text following note 17 supra.
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The availability of in pari delicto in a particular suit depends on
whether the defense applies to that type of fact pattern, the com-
parative guilt of the parties, and the trial court's discretion. At
common law, in pari delicto was available under either the strict or the
modern approach, depending on the jurisdiction. 3 0 A defendant
can invoke the defense under the strict approach only if the plaintiff
wronged the defendant in the transaction on which the plaintiff
predicates his relief. The modern approach allows the defense if
both parties mutually intended to commit the same wrongful ac-
tion.331 In addition to these traditional approaches, courts some-
times apply in pari delicto when the plaintiff breaches 1 Ob-5 or en-
gages in other unsavory conduct that is connected to his loss in some
way, even if his actions are unrelated to the defendant's miscon-
duct. 332 An example of this third approach is a tippee suing his
tipper for the amount the tippee lost when he bought stock based on
facts falsely represented by the tipper to be true inside informa-
tion.333 The third approach has been correctly criticized.3 34 Courts
should apply in pari delicto only to fact patterns within the two
traditional common-law approaches.3 3 5
330 Comment, Rule lOb-5: The In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands Defenses, 58 CAUF. L. REv.
1149, 1165 (1970).
'3' The person who was defrauded by the plaintiff and the defendant when they were in
pari delicto need not be a party to the lawsuit.
33' Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1969); Comment, The
Demise of In Pari Delicto in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory Schemes, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 572,
589-90 n.94 (1972); Comment, supra note 330, at 1165-66; see Bell, supra note 11, at 20 (since
parties not in pari delicto, court used unclean hands doctrine).
333 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 703-05 (5th Cir. 1969) (invoked defense);
Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (refused to reject defense). The Fifth
Circuit inKuehnert admitted it was going beyond the typical scope ofinpari delicto. 412 F.2d at
704 ("cannot be seen as inpari delicto even as to intention"). Prior toKuehnert, the Fifth Circuit
espoused the view that in pari delicto applied only when a defendant was "a knowing party to
[the] fraud." Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 208 (5th Cir. 1960). With
respect to the Kuehnert approach, see Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule
lOb-5 Actions, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 651, 666-67 n.79 (not really in pari delicto, but deny relief
because plaintiff's own breach caused loss). See A. JAcoBs § 167 nn.28-34 and accompanying
text.
34 See Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc. 325 F. Supp. 50, 52-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(defense rejected); A. JAcoBs § 167 n.29 and accompanying text.
335 Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 601 (5th Cir. 1975), quoting Keystone Driller
Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933) (patent infringement case describing
origin ofinparidelicto doctrine) ("only where some unconscionable act of one coming for relief
has immediate and necessary relation to the equity that he seeks in respect of the matter in
litigation"; not every transgression bars suit; unrelated conspiracy insufficient); Herzfeld v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & H.orwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), quoting
Comment, 54 MINN. L. REv. 878, 879 (1970) ("where the plaintiff has knowingly participated
as an equal in the illegal act which caused the loss"); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,
325 F. Supp. 50, 53 n.1 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Comment, supra note 15, at 184, 186-87 (do not use
in pari delicto if plaintiff violated one securities act provision and defendant commits indepen-
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Courts should first determine the fact patterns in which the in
pari delicto defense might be available. Next they should analyze the
comparative guilt of plaintiff and defendant. In pari delicto is avail-
able only if the plaintiff's acts are made knowingly"3 6 and are at least
as serious as the defendant's. 33 7 Thus, one party's knowledge of
another party's wrongdoing without the first party's active participa-
tion does not constitute in pari delicto,338 unless perhaps tle first
,party is obligated to act once he has knowledge.
Even if the first two steps indicate that the defendant could
employ in pari delicto, the trial court has discretion to permit or
disallow the defense.3 39 A judge should base his judgment on
dent violation, or if plaintiff breaches common law and defendant violates securities laws; use
defense if third party could sue plaintiff on same proof as plaintiff uses against defendant).
336 Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 604 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing and
rehearing en bane denied, 521 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub. nom. S.D. Cohn
& Co. v. Woolf, 96 S. Ct. 3161 (1976) ("knowing participant"); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec.
Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 208 (5th Cir. 1960) ("a knowing party to such fraud"); Herzfeld v.
Laventhol, Kerkstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("know-
ingly participated"); Hogan v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (N.D. 111. 1971) ("a
knowing, culpable party"); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D. Colo.
1968) (indemnity case; knowingly participated in fraud); 54 MINN. L. REV. 878, 879 (1970)
("knowingly participated as an equal in the illegal act which caused the loss"). The term
"knowing" probably means that the plaintiff was or should have been aware that he was
engaged in a scheme with the defendant, whether or not he knew of its illegality, and that he
was not coerced or unwillingly involved. See Comment, supra note 15, at 185-86; note 355
infra.
337 Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 603 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for rehearing and
rehearing en bane denied, 521 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub. nom. S.D. Cohn
& Co. v. Woolf, 96 S. Ct. 3161 (1976) quoting James v. DuBreuil 500 F.2d 155, 160 (5th Cir.
1974) ("mutual, simultaneous, and relatively equal" fault); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath.& Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("participated as an equal");
Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 53 n.1 1, 55 n.27, 57 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) ('generally contemplates equal and simultaneous participation by the parties in the
same illegal activity"); Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1106 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Eyman v.
Marsha Dev. Corp., 301 F. Supp. 931, 934 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Ruder, Multiple Defendants in
Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and
Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 662-64 (1972); Note, supra note 15, at 184; 54 MINN. L.
REv. 878, 879-82 (1970); Comment, Securities Fraud: Caveal Tippee-The Creation and Develop-
ment of a Doctrine, 33 U. Pn-r. L. REV. 79, 99 (1971) (impose liability on more guilty party; can
consider fiduciary relationship); see 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 725, 727 n. 19 (1972) (allow defense
only if plaintiff so tainted as to be undeserving of aid); authorities cited in note 326 supra; cf.
Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1964) (1933 Act).
33 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1969); Comment, supra note
330, at 1154; f. Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1054 (2d Cir. 1969) (1933 Act
§ 12(1)); Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1941) (Exchange Act § 9).
"' James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1974); Clement A. Evans & Co. v.
McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath
& Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,
325 F. Supp. 50, 52 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89, 92 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Ruder, supra note 337, at 662 n.293; Comment, supra note 15, at 183.
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whether permitting the defense furthers the Rule's underlying
policies 340 and whether the threat of a private right of action deters
defendants from violating the Rule.341 Authorities treating the
availability of in pari delicto under other securities acts remedies 342
or under the common law343 are not persuasive, since 1 Ob-5 has dif-
ferent underlying policies. Similarly, a court could find in pari delicto
appropriate for one type of IOb-5 violation (e.g., tipping), but not for
another (e.g., mismanagement).
Although a trial court's discretion limits our ability to predict
when in pari delicto will be successfully asserted, 344 past holdings are
of some precedential value. In pari delicto defeated a plaintiff's claim
when: management accepted a bribe from a tenderor;345 plaintiff
back-dated a document to circumvent the securities laws;346 claimant
willfully misrepresented; 347 and one party to a contract to purchase
securities concealed that the same investment banker was acting for
340 Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 602, 604 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing and
rehearing en banc denied, 521 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1975),vacated and remanded sub. nom. S.D. Cohn
& Co. v. Woolf, 96 S. Ct. 3161 (1976) (give substantial weight to protection of investing public);
James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 159, 160 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974) (increase protection of public);
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969); Herzfeld v. Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (get maximum
deterrence; protect investors); Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1085 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50,52-53 & n.8, 55-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89,91 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Comment, TheDemise ofInPari
Delicto in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory Schemes, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 572, 584, 586-87,
590-92, 604 (1972) (discussing Supreme Court's decision on in pari delicto in antitrust field;
should limit defense); Comment, supra note 15, at 182, 188; 44 TULANE L. REV. 618, 622
(1970); cf. Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076, 1085-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(Commodities Exchange Act). See also Bell, supra note 11, at 4 (10b-5's remedial purposes limit
defense to narrowest common law views). As to the policies underlying 1Ob-5 and its remedial
nature, see A. JAcoBs § 6 and § 7 n.8 and accompanying text.
341 Comment, The Demise of In Pari Delicto in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatoiy Schemes,
60 CALIF. L. REV. 572, 584, 591, 604 (1972). A final factor determining the application ofinpari
delicto is whether the defendant used economic duress to force the plaintifftojoin him in the
breach. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969).
3"' See A. JAcoBs § 3.01[b] n.10 (1933 Act § 12(1)), § 3.02[b] n.34 (margin rules) and
accompanying texts. See also id. § 3.02[e] nn.38-39 and accompanying text (unclean hands
under proxy rules).
34' Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969) (avoid common-law
technicalities).
344 Id. at 706 n.3 (dissenting opinion) ("there are problems of deciding when a party's
'badness' is sufficient to warrant the application of in pari delicto, which makes [sic] it almost
impossible to create an orderly and consistent body of law on the subject"); Ruder, supra note
337, at 660-62 (policies of deterrence and compensation do not produce consistent application
of in pari delicto).
345 Hogan v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
346 James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 158-60 (5th Cir. 1974).
'4 See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 138
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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both parties.348 On the other hand, in pari delicto was not employed
when: defendants defrauded a corporation into issuing shares for
inadequate consideration; 349 ostensibly to establish a value for con-
demnation purposes, defendant fraudulently sold land to plain-
tiff;3 50 a plaintiff gave a false investment representation; 351 and a
customer traded on the basis of advance notice of his .broker's
recommendation. 352
B. Unclean Hands
Unclean hands is a companion defense to inpari delicto. It denies
affirmative equitable relief to a plaintiff who is guilty of unlawful or
inequitable conduct arising out of the matter for which he seeks
relief.353 The defense is designed to protect the court's integrity and
the public interest, rather than to aid the defendant.3 54 Unclean
hands has been recognized as a defense to a lOb-5 action for equita-
ble relief.3 55 Because few 10b-5 cases discuss this defense, how-
348 Ply-Gem Indus., Inc. v. Green, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,026, at 94,128-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd in part, remanded in part on other grounds,
503 F.2d 1362 (2d Cir. 1974).
349 Hooper v. Mountain States Secs. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1960) (corpo-
ration not knowing party to fraud); see Rosen v. Dick, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,786, at 96,606 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099,
1106 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
350 Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 451, 457 (9th Cir. 1956).
351 Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 604-05 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing and
rehearing en bane denied, 521 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub. nom. S.D. Cohn
& Co. v. Woolf, 96 S. Ct. 3161 (1976).
352 Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
353 Graphics Sciences, Inc. v. International Mogul Mines Ltd., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,834, at 96,804 (D.D.C. 1974) (undean hands "doses the
doors of equity to one who has acted inequitably or with bad faith relative to the matter in
which he seeks relief"); 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 337, 340 n.25 (1969); 54 MINN. L. REv. 878,
879 (1970); cf. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp.
895, 921 (D. Del. 1973) (proxy rules; plaintiff "guilty of a violation involving the translation in
litigation"); 27 AM. JUR. Equity § 142, at 679 (1966) (common law); 30 C.J.S. Equity § 93, at
1006, 1009 (1965); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 940, comments b and c at 708-09 (1939).
35" Jackson v. Oppenheim, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RaP. 93,008,
at 90,717 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cartier v. Dutton, 45 F.R.D. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 38 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 337, 340 n.25 (1969).
35- James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1974); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412
F.2d 700, 703-04 (5th Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Oppenheim, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,008, at 90,717 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89,91-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Chaney v. Western States Title Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 376, 378 n.1 1 (D. Utah
1968); Levy v. D. Kaltman & Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,211, at 96,973 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Cartier v. Dutton, 45 F.R.D. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Note,supra note 327, at 85-87. There is some authority that unclean hands is also available for
legal remedies. See Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., sspra at 704; Wohl v. Blair & Co., supra at 92
(quotingKuehnert); Bell, supra note 11, at 20 (discussing Kuehnert); 44 TULANE L. REv. 618, 623
(1970). Contra, 1 LOYOLA U.L.J. 146, 149 (1970) (historically does not apply to damage actions).
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ever, the conclusions regarding this action rely in part on common-
law authorities. 356
The first question regarding the availability of unclean hands is
whether the plaintiff's acts were sufficiently reprehensible and
closely enough connected to the wrong.35 7 A breach by the plaintiff
of IOb-5, another statute, or the common law is sufficient. Inequita-
ble conduct also meets the requirements of this defense. 35 8 How-
ever, the objectionable actions must be intentional. Acts done inad-
vertantly or with misapprehension of legal rights will not support
the unclean hands defense.3 5 9 The plaintiff's actions must arise out
of the subject of the suit,3 60 although he need not participate directly
in the defendant's illegal conduct.3 6 1 Unclean hands cannot be
founded upon the plaintiff's bad moral character or on his deeds in
other transactions. 3 62 If the plaintiff's actions adequately establish
... See Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 53 n. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
("infrequently applied"); 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 337, 341 (1969) (unclean hands received
limited application where might interfere with public policy).
3-7 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1969) ("actual illegal con-
duct"); cf. 30 C.J.S. Equity § 95, at 1018-19 (1965).
38 -Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. International Mogul Mines, Ltd., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,834, at 96,804 (D.D.C. 1974) ("acted inequitably or with
bad faith"); Bell, supra note 11, at 20 (impure heart); 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 337, 340 n.25
(1969); 54 MINN. L. REv. 878, 879 (1970) ("unfair practices"); see Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,
412 F.2d 700, 703-05 (5th Cir. 1969) (questioning adequacy of impure heart, and seemingly
answering in affirmative); cf. 27 AM. JUR. Equity § 136, at 668 (1966); 30 C.J.S. Equity § 95, at
1018-19 (1965); D. DOBBS, supra note 193, § 2.4, at 46.
359 Cf. 30 CJS. Equity § 95, at. 1021-22 (1965). See also Kuehnert v. Texstar'Corp., 412
F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969) ("looked to intent"); Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89, 92
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (quoting Kuehnert).
360 Meis v. Sanitas Serv. Corp., 511 F.2d 655, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1975) (doctrine not
invoked, for no relation to subject matter of suit); SEC v. Bull Inv. Group, Inc., [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,010, at 97,522 (D. Mass. 1975) (need correlation
between SEC's breach and conduct it seeks to enjoin); Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. International
Mogul Mines, Ltd., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,834, at 96,804
(D.D.C. 1974) ("relative to the matter in which he seeks relief"); Cartier v. Dutton, 45 F.R.D.
278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("available when the conduct relied upon is directly related to the
subject matter in litigation"); 40 FoRD-AM L. REv. 725, 727 n.19 (1972) (cause of action must
arise out of circumstances occasioned by misconduct); 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 337, 340 n.25
(1969); 44 TUL. L. REv. 618, 623-24 (1970) ("arise out of same transaction as the action in
litigation"); Comment, supra note 330, at 1165; cf. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent
Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895, 921 (D. Del. 1973) (proxy rules; "involving the
transaction in litigation"); 27 AM.JUR. 2dEquity § 142, at 679 (1966); D. DoBBS,supra note 193,
§ 2.4, at 46 ("source, or part of the source, of his equitable claim"); RESTATErMENT OF ToRTs §
940, comments b and c at 708-09 (1939).
361 Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 53 n.l1 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
361 Meis v. Sanitas Serv. Corp., 511 F.2d 655, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1975) (blameless life not
required); Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. International Mogul Mines, Ltd., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,834, at 96,804 (D.D.C. 1974) (no requirement for
blamelessness in other matters); cf. 30 C.J.S. Equity § 98, at 1034 (1965); RESTATEMENT OF
ToRTs § 940 (1939).
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unclean hands under these criteria, the defense is not lost merely
because the plaintiff's actions were less objectionable than the de-
fendant's 363 and did not injure him.3 64 Obviously, whether these
criteria are met is a question of fact. 365
Even if the plaintiff's acts indicate that unclean hands is avail-
able,.a trial court has discretion not to allow the defense.366 Unfa-
vored at common law,367 unclean hands should be applied even
more narrowly in 10b-5 cases.368  In exercising their discretion,
judges should consider the comparative guilt of plaintiff and defen-
dant, and the amount of injury flowing from the plaintiff's acts. The
most important measure, however, is whether the policies underly-
ing lOb-5 and its remedial nature369 are better promoted by grant-
ing or withholding the defense. Stated differently, a court should
adopt unclean hands as a defense only when this result promotes the
ends the securities laws seek to achieve. 37 0 As the policies underlying
1Ob-5 differ from those involved in other securities acts remedies,
the availability of unclean hands under those other provisions371 is at
best a weak analogy.
V
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Section 27 of the 1934 Act vests exclusive subject matter juris-
diction in federal courts over actions brought under that Act, indud-
363 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 725, 727 n.19 (1972) (if strictly construed, dismiss no matter how
slight plaintiff's guilt); cf. 30 C.J.S. Equity § 93, at 1009-11, § 95, at 1023 (1965).
311 38 GEo. WASH. L. Rzv. 337, 341 (1969); cf. 30 C.J.S. Equity § 95, at 1025-26 (1965).
36' Cf. 30 C.J.S. Equity § 93, at 1013 (1965).
366 James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1974); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412
F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969); Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. International Mogul Mines, Ltd.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,834, at 96,804 (D.D.C. 1974); Wohl
v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89,92 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); cf. Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467,474 (5th Cir.
1973) (1933 Act § 5); 30 C.J.S. Equity § 99, at 1048 (1965).
367 30 C.J.S. Equity § 99, at 1048 (1965).
368 See Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700,704 (5th Cir. 1969) (avoid common law
technicalities).
"' See A. JACOBS § 6, § 7 n.8 and accompanying text.
171 James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 159, 160 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974) (increase protection of
public); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969); Nathanson v. Weis,
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Bell, supra note 11, at 20-21; 1
LOYOLA U.L.J. 146, 149 n.18 (1970); 44 TuLANE L. REv. 618, 622-24 (1970); see Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 n.7 (2d Cir. 1969) (if
management and tender offeror breach securities law, unclean hands provides cold comfort
to innocent stockholders); Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (strike
balance between policies); cf. Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467,474 (5th Cir. 1973) (1933 Act § 5)
(whether application or nonapplication of defense will better promote objectives of securities
laws).
371 See A. JACOBs § 3.02[e] nn.38-39 and accompanying text (proxy rules).
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ing 1 Ob-5 suits. 372 This jurisdictional restriction raises difficult issues
involving the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel37 3 in
lOb-5 actions.
Federal law governs the scope of res judicata and collateral
estoppel in lOb-5 cases.374 A prior state court settlement or judg-
ment has no resjudicata effect on a subsequent 1Ob-5 suit.375 This
conclusion is grounded both in the state court's lack ofjurisdiction to
adjudicate the IOb-5 claim 376 and in the fact that 1Ob-5 is a different
cause of action from the state claim.3 7 7
The vast majority of cases recognize collateral estoppel as a
defense, whether the prior litigation was determined by a state
372 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
373 A full discussion of these defenses is beyond the scope of this Article. Authorities on
res judicata and collateral estoppel include RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 41-111 (1942);
Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1942); Developments in the Law-Res
Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818 (1952). Different from resjudicata and collateral estoppel is the
reduction of damages in a 10b-5 suit by a prior recovery in an action on another claim. See
1934 Act § 28(a).
'74 Fink v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988, 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); cf. Pearlstein v. Scudder &
German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1143 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971) (federal public
policy). As to the basic definition of and differences between res judicata and collateral
estoppel, see Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876). See also Northern Trust Co. v.
Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 958-59 (N.D. Ill. 1952) (following Cromwell
definition in lOb-5 context).
375 Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975),
Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968); Lewis v. Marine
Midland Grace Trust Co., 63 F.R.D. 39, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Loeb v. Whittaker Corp., 333 F.
Supp. 484,489 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Wellington Computer Graphics, Inc. v. Modell, 315 F. Supp.
24, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 279 F. Supp. 573, 578
(W.D. Pa. 1967) (motion to dismiss), affd, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968); Block, Current Critical
Points in Stockholder Litigation, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 181, 197-202 (1967); Note, The Effect of Prior
Nonfederal Proceedings on Exclusive FederalJurisdiction Over Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of.1934, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 936,941-47 (1971); cf. Puma v. Marriott, 348 F. Supp. 18,21 (D.
Del. 1972) (proxy rules). However, lOb-5 claims can be released as part of a state court
settlement. Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762; Simon v. Garrett, [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,732, at 96,433-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Dembitzer v. First Republic Corp. of America, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. T 91,566, at 95,141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Note, supra at 947-50. Nor does it preclude res
judicata defeating a pendent common-law claim in a 1Ob-5 suit when a prior state court action
was based on the same cause of action. Glickman v. Schweickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670, 674
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
376 Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); Lewis v.
Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 63 F.R.D. 39, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Wellington Computer
Graphics, Inc. v. Modell, 315 F. Supp. 24, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Moran v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, 279 F. Supp. 573, 579 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (motion for summary judgment),
affd, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968); cf. Puma v. Marriott, 348 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D. Del. 1972)
(proxy rules).
377 Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968). Contra, Con-
nelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 55-60 (N.D. Ohio 1959), affd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th
Cir. 1960) (Ohio common law and I Ob-5 same cause of action; therefore, resjudicata appro-
priate). For a comparison of lOb-5 and common law, see A. JACOBS § 2 and §11.01.
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court,3 78 or in arbitration.37 9 But slight authority suggests that the
litigation of issues in a prior state action should not bind a federal
court in a 1 Ob-5 suit because the state court had no subject matter
jurisdiction over the lOb-5 cause of action.380 The following example
illustrates the crucial impact this defense may have on the outcome
of a lOb-5 action. The plaintiff claims that a merger proxy statement
is misleading and that the exchange ratio is unfair. In a common-
law fraud action, the state court finds these claims to lack merit. A
federal court in a subsequent 10b-5 action would use collateral
estoppel to resolve these two issues against the plaintiff and to
dismiss the 10b-5 claim.38  An analogous situation arises when a
state court determines 10b-5 issues that are raised as a defense in
that action. These issues could collaterally estop the parties in a
subsequent 1 Ob-5 federal case arising from the same transactions. 38 2
376 Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.), rev'g 317 F. Supp. 185,
188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971); Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp.,
392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968); Lefferts v. Silverstein, 396 F. Supp. 983, 985 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); Gilbert v. Meyer, 362 F. Supp. 168, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Lewis v. Marine Midland
Grace Trust Co., 63 F.R.D. 39, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Care Corp. v. Kiddie Care Corp., 344 F.
Supp. 12, 17 n.4 (D. Del. 1972); GCA Corp. v. Coler, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 93,339, at 91,815 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Loeb v. Whittaker Corp., 333 F. Supp. 484,
489 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(same counterclaim in state and federal court); Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 306 F. Supp.
743, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 55, 60-61 (N.D. Ohio 1959),
affd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960); Gallo v. Mayer, 50 Misc. 2d 385, 387, 270
N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (Sup. Ct.), aff d, 272 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (2d Dep't 1966); Simpson, Investors'
Civil Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 12 DEPAUL L. REv. 71, 93 (1962); see Clark v.
Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997-99 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975) (assuming collateral
estoppel applicable); Klein v. Walston & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 92,849, at 90,179 (2d Cir. 1970). See also Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d
255, 301 (3d Cir.) (concurring and dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972)
(proceeding in foreign country possibly sufficient for collateral estoppel); Kane v. Central Am.
Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Panamanian restrictions on right to
sue cannot limit federal securities laws). But cf. In re Four Seasons Secs. Laws Litigation, 370 F.
Supp. 219, 236 & n.43 (W.D. Okla. 1974) (difference in burden of proof precludes collateral
estoppel). Based on this principle, a defendant who wins in a common law action may be
unable to employ collateral estoppel in a subsequent lOb-5 case.
M7 Frier Indus., Inc. v. Glickman, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,845, at 96,850 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 279 F. Supp.
573, 582 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (motion for summary judgment) aff'd, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968);
see Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1103 (2d Cir. 1970); Vernitron
Corp. v. Benjamin, 317 F. Supp. 185, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),rev'd on other grounds, 440 F.2d
105 (2d Cir. 1971).
380 Cf. Puma v. Marriott, 348 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D. Del. 1972) (proxy rules).
381 Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168, 174-75 (D. Del. 1966).
3'2 Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),affd, 452
F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Brenner v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 494 F.2d 881,
881-82 (9th Cir. 1974) (if compulsory counterclaim not asserted in state court action, collateral
estoppel bars its assertion in a subsequent federal suit under margin rules). But cf. Pearlstein
v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1143-44 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013
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If ajury trial was not available in the prior state court action, the
right to a jury trial in 10b-5 cases38 3 can prevent the application of
collateral estoppel as a defense to a federal suit.a" For the same
reason, an adjudication against a defendant in a 10b-5 civil suit
brought by the SEC in federal court cannot be used against him in a
later private action arising from the same fact pattern.3 85 But the
plaintiff in a 10b-5 civil suit can premise collateral estoppel on an
earlier criminal conviction rendered after trial, since ajury is availa-
ble in criminal matters. 38 6 If a 10b-5 suit is prosecuted in federal
court, res judicata or collateral estoppel determines any common-
law fraud claims the parties may assert subsequently as to the same
transaction in state court.
38 7
VI
OTHER DEFENSES
Defendants have argued that a few other, less important topics
should be affirmative defenses.
-Appraisal rights. A defendant cannot successfully assert as a
defense either that the plaintiffs had no appraisal rights in a corpo-
rate transaction such as a merger, or that they failed to exercise
them.388
-Disclosure and Curing. Actions that would constitute a non-
substantive 1Ob-5 violation if uninterrupted can be cured by full
(1971) (consent judgment in state court has no res judicata effect against federal coun-
terdaim).
383 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
384 Essex Sys. Co. v. Steinberg, 335 F. Supp. 298, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
3" Rachal v. Hill, 435 F,2d 59, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,861, at 96,916 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 323 F. Supp. 990, 993-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see Pitofsky v.
Brucker, 291 F. Supp. 321, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (cannot rely on step order proceeding of
SEC).
386 Cf SEC v. Kelly, Andrews & Bradley, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 948, 954 n.27 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (Securities Investor Protection Act). A guilty plea in a criminal trial should have no
collateral estoppel effect since no issue was litigated. Rueff v. Van Allen, [1961-1964 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. V 91,248, at 94,126-27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (no resjudicata or
collateral estoppel effect on private action brought in state court under 1933 Act § 17(a));
Note, Collateral Estoppel: Criminal Conviction Based on Plea of Guilty Declared Conclusive of Issues in
a Subsequent Civil Suit Between the Same Parties, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 340 (1963).
387 Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 352 (Del. Ch. 1972); Gallo v. Mayer, 50
Misc. 2d 385, 387, 270 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (Sup. Ct.),af'd, 272 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (2d Dep't 1966).
Contra, Stewart v. United Australian Oil, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 95,019, at 97,576-77 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (collateral estoppel, but not res judicata,
exists).
388 See A. JACOBS § 117.02 n.11.
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disclosure prior to the time the plaintiff acts or is irrevocably com-
mitted to act.389 Disclosure in this context is not an affirmative
defense, for it cures the prior misleading statement before a breach
occurs. But disclosure cannot cure a substantive breach of the
Rule.3 90
-- Contract for an illegal purpose. A contract by which the parties
agree to violate Rule lOb-5 is illegal and unenforceable. 91 For
example, the parties may agree to manipulate the market for a
security. Illegal contracts must be distinguished from agreements
having a legal purpose-such as a merger agreement-but which
are voidable by one party because the other misrepresented material
facts.
-Death of parties. A IOb-5 cause of action survives the death of
either plaintiff or defendant.392
-Contributory negligence. Courts should reject contributory neg-
ligence as a defense in 10b-5 suits, 3 93 even if negligence were the
standard for the defendant's care.394
-Assumption of the risk. Some scant authority would bar recovery
under 1 Ob-5 if the plaintiff assumes the risk.395 Under the rationale
of the better-reasoned contributory negligence decisions, judges
should not embrace this defense,396 particularly since a plaintiff
must prove the defendant's fraudulent intent.
3 9 7
-Assignees. If a person obtains for value and without notice a
defendant's contractual rights against the plaintiff, he may have a
defense that the defendant did not possess.398
-- Sovereign immunity. The United States may not be sued with-
389 See id. § 64.04.
"0 See id. § 64.04 n.9 and accompanying text.
391 Davis v. Pennzoil Co., 438 Pa. 194, 209, 264 A.2d 597, 605 (1970).
392 Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 223 F. Supp. 265, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (defendant's
death); Dauphin Corp. v. Sentinel Alarm Corp., 206 F. Supp. 432, 436 (D. Del. 1962)
(defendant's death); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 761-62 (D.N.J. 1955) (plaintiffs
death).
193 See A. JACOBS § 64.0 1[b][ii] n.71 for decisions treating the question of contributory
negligence.
294 The Supreme Court has recently rejected negligence in private damage actions,
however. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976). Regarding the standard of care
previously adopted in private damage actions for misleading statements, see A. JAcoBs § 63
nn.26-30 and accompanying text.
395 Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234, 239 (D. Neb. 1972), affid, 473 F.2d
537 (8th Cir. 1973).
396 See notes 393-94 and accompanying text supra.
397 Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
398 Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200, 1211-12 (E.D. Ark. 1972);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(c); 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(c) (1970); see Basch v. Talley Indus.,
Inc., 53 F.R.D. 9, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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out its consent,3 99 and it has not consented to suit under lOb-5. 40 0
Aside from a state's sovereign immunity, the eleventh amendment
of the United States Constitution prohibits actions against a state by
one of its citizens for its lOb-5 breaches. 40 1
-Bankruptcy. A defendant's discharge in bankruptcy should not
release his provable 1Ob-5 liabilities if he acted with fraudulent
intent or recklessly.40 2
-Parol evidence rule. Although not an affirmative defense, the
parol evidence rule cannot defeat a 1Ob-5 claim. 40 3
-Insanity. A psychiatric defense might be available in 1Ob-5
suits.
4 0 4
-Legal advice. Legal advice that an action is permissible under
1 Ob-5 does not provide a defense, although it may bear on scienter
or on penalties in an administrative proceeding.40 5
CONCLUSION
The topic of affirmative defenses has become increasingly im-
portant as 1 Ob-5 has grown lustily in many areas. A plaintiff should
insure that he does not lose a valid claim by acting in a manner that
enables a defendant to establish a defense. On the other hand, a
defendant should try to limit his exposure by raising all available
defenses.
3" Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141-43 (1972); United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
400 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141-43 (1972); cf. Safeway
Portland Employees' Fed. Credit Union v. FDIC, 506 F.2d 1213, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1974)
(FDIC; Securities Act).
401 Brown v. Kentucky, 513 F.2d 333, 334-36 & n.2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839
(1975) (state did not waive eleventh amendment). Compare Forman v. Community Servs., Inc.,
500 F.2d 1246, 1256 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 837, 846 n.1 1 (1975) (state
waives immunity by entering securities field), with MacKethan v. Virginia, 370 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.
Va.), aff'd, 508 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1974) (entering securities field does not constitute waiver).
402 McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 352 F. Supp. 454, 455 (N.D. Tex. 1973), affd, 497 F.2d
490 (5th Cir. 1974); cf. Wright v. Lubinko, 515 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1975) (construing California
blue sky law). As to the scienter standard now in force, see note 394 supra.
40 See note 257 supra and accompanying text.
404 Davidoff, The Psychiatric Defense, 8 REv. SEC. REG. 880 (1975).
4" See A. JACOBS § 63 n.43 and accompanying text.
